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Abstract 
The thresholds auditors use when issuing going concern modified audit opinions to clients are 
of interest to both policymakers and financial statement users. Because a going concern opinion 
requires a forecast of a future event (i.e. client business failure), this reporting decision involves 
considerable uncertainty and a trade-off between possible Type I and Type II reporting errors. 
The relative costs of these errors will depend on the level of litigation risk. We analyze whether 
variations in litigation risk arising from the ideology of U.S. federal judges affect auditors’ 
going concern reporting behavior. The prior literature shows that the ideology of federal judges 
in the circuit where a company is headquartered is an important ex-ante determinant of 
litigation occurrence and outcomes. We find that in circuits with more liberal judges, hence 
greater litigation risk, Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors tend to converge in their reporting 
decisions. This is caused by the greater effect of judge ideology on non-Big 4 auditors than on 
Big 4 auditors. Consistent with previous international studies, we also find that audit fees of 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors converge in circuits with more liberal judges. We do not find a 
statistically significant relationship between federal judge ideology and auditor choice. Our 
results are robust to several matched samples, and contribute to an understanding of the 
importance of federal legal liability in determining the audit quality differences between Big 4 
and non-Big 4 firms. 
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Federal Judge Ideology and the Converging Reporting Incentives of Big 4 and non-Big 
4 Auditors 
1. Introduction  
 The auditor’s evaluation of a company’s ability to continue to operate as a going 
concern is an important part of an audit under federal securities law (Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, Section 10A) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
auditing standards (AU sec. 341). Section 10A of the 1934 Act requires that audits include “an 
evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the issuer to continue as a 
going concern during the ensuing fiscal year.” Because the term “substantial doubt” is currently 
undefined in auditing rules, auditors have considerable discretion in determining the thresholds 
for issuing going concern opinions. Conceptual discussions of auditors’ going concern 
reporting incentives allude to the importance of the federal legal regime toughness, but 
empirical evidence on the issue is surprisingly limited. Since 2012 the PCAOB has considered 
revisions to the existing going concern auditing standards to enhance auditors’ evaluation 
processes, including clarification of the term “substantial doubt” (PCAOB Investor Advisory 
Group Meeting, 2012, 2015). To produce more effective standards, policymakers are 
particularly interested in the factors that influence auditors’ going concern reporting decisions 
(PCAOB Investor Advisory Group Meeting, 2015). We examine the effects of within-U.S. 
auditor legal liability differences associated with variations in the political ideology of U.S. 
Federal Appeals Court judges on auditors’ going concern reporting behavior.  
 Specifically, we develop a simple model of an auditor’s optimal going concern decision 
as a function of the costs of Type I error (issuing a going concern modified opinion for clients 
that do not go bankrupt in the subsequent year) and Type II error (failing to issue a modified 
going concern opinion for companies that subsequently go bankrupt) where the relative costs 
of these errors depend on the level of litigation risk. We then empirically examine how 
variations in the ideology of judges across federal circuits affect the likelihoods that Big 4 
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auditors and non-Big 4 auditors will issue a modified going concern opinion on the financial 
statements of financially distressed clients and the accuracy of these reporting decisions.   
While there are many studies that examine differences in audit fees and discretionary 
accruals across countries with different legal environments (e.g., Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; 
Seetharaman et al., 2002; Choi, Kim, Liu and Simunic, 2008) and some within the U.S. under 
different legal regimes (e.g., Venkataraman, Weber and Willenborg, 2008), 1 only a limited 
number of studies examine how legal environments affect auditors’ going concern reporting. 
Specifically, Anantharam, Pittman, and Wans (2016) find that a tougher state-level common 
law legal regime is associated with a greater likelihood of receiving a modified going concern 
opinion. They do not find a significant difference between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. 
DeFond, Francis, and Hallman (2016) examine whether the degree of oversight by the 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) affects auditors’ going concern reporting. They 
study the effect of varying proximity of auditors to regional SEC offices on auditor reporting 
decisions, and find that closer proximity has an impact on non-Big 4 auditors, but not Big 4 
auditors.  
While these prior studies provide important insights into litigation factors affecting 
auditors’ going concern reporting incentives, there is no existing research as to whether and 
how variation in perceived federal legal liability within the U.S. affects auditors’ going concern 
reporting, even though most third party (investor) litigation against auditors is filed in federal 
courts (Kaplan and Willams, 2013). Empirical evidence on the effects of state-level legal 
liability (Anantharam, Pittman, and Wans, 2016) cannot be directly applied to federal legal 
                                                 
1 For instance, Seetharaman et al. (2002) and Choi et al. (2009) document that auditors charge higher fees for 
firms that are cross-listed in countries with stronger regimes than they do for non-cross-listed firms. In the U.S. 
setting, Venkataraman, Weber and Willenborg (2008) examine how the differences between the very tough 
legal liability imposed by section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 vs. the milder liability provisions of Section 
10 and SEC Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 affect audit fees. 
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liability because federal securities laws are concerned with the protection of the buyers and 
sellers of securities, while state laws mostly govern the auditors’ relationship with other parties, 
namely clients and creditors. As a result, “tougher” federal legal liability can be expected to 
have different incentive effects than “tougher” state laws.2 We study the effects of variations 
in legal interpretation within the federal law and add to the extant literature by analyzing how 
the variation within federal legal liability affects Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors’ going concern 
reporting incentives.  
Concerning variations within the federal law, the legal literature has extensively 
documented that the political ideology of judges is the most important attribute that influences 
judges’ decisions in lawsuits (e.g., Johnston, 1976; Segal and Cover, 1989; Tate, 1981; Staudt, 
Epstein, and Wiedenbeck, 2006). Applying the political theory of judicial decision-making that 
liberal judges are more protective of investors, Hui, Li, and Huang (2018) construct a measure 
of firms’ ex-ante litigation risk based on the political ideology of federal judges. They find that 
firms located in more liberal circuits (i.e. circuits with a higher value of the constructed 
measure) are more likely to be sued, and that lawsuits filed in more liberal circuits are less 
likely to be dismissed and result in higher settlement amounts. Their evidence is consistent 
with the legal literature that more liberal judges are more likely to favor plaintiffs. We follow 
Hui et al. (2018) in constructing the measure of federal judge ideology by calculating judge 
ideology for the eleven U.S. Federal Court circuits and the D.C. circuit as the probability that 
a panel of three judges randomly selected from the circuit is dominated by appointees of 
Democratic Presidents. We investigate whether this proxy measure of litigation risk is 
associated with auditors’ likelihoods of issuing a modified going concern opinion for Big 4 
auditors and non-Big 4 ones, and the accuracy of that decision.  
                                                 
2 Third parties can only hold the auditor liable under Section 10b-5 for fraud, which requires the intent to 
deceive. Auditor liability for ordinary negligence is governed by common law.  
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Applying a simple model of auditors’ trade-offs between Type I and Type II errors, we 
show that if Big 4 auditors bear a sufficiently high level of litigation risk as compared to non-
Big 4 auditors when the level of judge liberality is low, the likelihood of Big 4 auditors and 
non-Big 4 auditors issuing going concern opinions will converge as the litigation risk arising 
from judge ideology increases. Using a large sample of financially distressed companies and 
examining the interaction between the Big 4 indicator variable and the level of judge liberality, 
we find that as the judge liberality of federal circuits in which the companies are headquartered 
increases the going concern reporting behavior of the Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms tends to 
converge. We also find that when the level of judge liberality is low, Big 4 auditors are more 
likely to issue modified going concern opinions than non-Big 4 auditors. In subsample analyses 
we find that the probability that a distressed company will receive a modified going concern 
opinion from its auditor is not changed if the auditor is a Big 4 firm. However, for the clients 
of non-Big 4 audit firms, the probability of receiving a going concern modified opinion 
increases significantly. These results suggest that the heightened litigation risk associated more 
liberal judges motivates the non-Big 4 firms to be more independent of their clients’ interests 
and more “defensive” in their reporting decisions. The evidence is consistent with the 
prediction that the variation in federal judge ideology has differential effects on Big 4 auditors 
and non-Big 4 auditors.  
Concerning reporting accuracy, we find that the Type II error rates (failing to issue a 
going concern opinion for companies that subsequently are bankrupt) do not vary significantly 
between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms, irrespective of the litigation risk associated with 
judge ideology. However, in circuits with a low level of judge liberality, the Type I error rate 
for Big 4 audit firms is higher than for the non-Big 4 firms, when differences in client 
characteristics between the two types of audit firms are controlled. As the litigation risk (across 
the 12 federal court circuits) associated with judge ideology increases, the Type I error rate for 
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Big 4 firms remains unchanged while the Type I error rate increases significantly for the non-
Big 4 firms. The greater willingness of non-Big 4 audit firms to commit Type I errors, relative 
to the Big 4 firms, as litigation risk increases suggests that the loss functions of the Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 are not the same with respect to their weighting of Type I and Type II errors. 
Specifically, this is consistent with non-Big 4 firms being less independent and concerned with 
client retention when litigation risk is relatively low. However, as investor litigation risk 
increases thereby increasing the cost of Type II reporting errors, the heightened legal liability 
associated with more liberal judge ideology motivates a change in the behavior of non-Big 4 
audit firms that makes them more similar to the Big 4 firms in terms of the likelihood of issuing 
a going concern opinion. 
To substantiate that the greater effect of federal judge ideology on non-Big 4 auditors 
are not driven by the non-Big 4 clients’ potentially greater bankruptcy probability, we adopt 
several sub-samples of Big 4 clients whose characteristics are matched to client characteristics 
of non-Big 4 clients. This issue would be a potential concern if we miss important controls for 
clients’ bankruptcy probability and these controls are captured by the non-Big 4 indicator 
variable.3  To address this potential concern, we adopt matched sample analyses and also 
include firm-fixed effects in the separate analyses of the Big 4 sub-sample and non-Big 4 sub-
sample. In addition, we directly examine whether the Big 4 indicator variable is associated with 
clients’ likelihood of bankruptcy in the subsequent year. Inferences from these empirical 
specifications suggest that differential effects between Big 4 and non-Big 4 remains. Finally, 
we investigate the association between federal judge ideology and auditor choice to address the 
concern that auditor choice might affect the relative importance of each client and thereby 
affect auditor independence as reflected in their going concern audit reports. Results suggest 
                                                 
3 This concern is actually not very likely because we find a significantly positive coefficient on the Big 4 
indicator variable, which means that Big 4 auditors are more likely to issue going concern modified audit 
opinions.  
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that federal judge ideology and auditor choice do not have a statistically significant association. 
Collectively, the evidence suggests that the difference in Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors’ going 
concern reporting incentives varies in different circuits.  
Our study is important to understanding the effects of variations in litigation risk on 
auditor behavior. Our evidence indicates that external auditors exert discretion in defining 
“substantial doubt about the ability of the issuer to continue as a going concern” and results of 
this decision vary with federal level litigation risk and auditor type. These findings are 
particularly relevant for regulators who are currently assessing the proposal of changing the 
existing auditing standard regarding auditors’ going concern evaluation of their clients. Our 
findings are also informative to investors in interpreting the implication of modified going 
concern audit opinions. 
As noted earlier, most studies of the effects of variations in litigation risk are 
international in scope and investigate how audit fees and the properties of discretionary 
accruals vary across countries (e.g., Choi et al., 2008; Seetharaman et al., 2002). While 
international studies are useful, these studies – by their nature – involve many other cross-
country differences so that it is difficult to establish that ceteris paribus conditions exist. For 
example, Clarkson and Simunic compare the effects of the legal regimes in the U.S. vs. Canada 
on auditor choice and the behavior of entrepreneurs and auditors in the markets for initial public 
offerings in the two countries. However, Canadian companies tend to be much smaller than 
U.S. companies, and business ethics are not necessarily identical even in these two quite similar 
countries, so that ceteris paribus may not hold. Our study mitigates this concern by examining 
situations where the degree of federal legal liability varies within one country. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a simple 
model of an auditor’s going concern reporting decision that focuses on the impact of variations 
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in legal liability on an auditor’s cost-benefit trade-off associated with going concern reporting. 
In section 3, we present institutional background information, discuss related prior literature, 
and develop our hypothesis to be tested. Our empirical tests are developed in section 4.  Section 
5 presents our findings, including several robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. A Model of the Going Concern Reporting Decision When Litigation Risk Varies 
 Consider the following 2-action, 2-state going concern reporting decision that an 
auditor faces after completing all necessary audit tests that yield “sufficient appropriate 
evidence” that the financial statements are, indeed, free of material misstatements. Assume that 
the auditor’s optimal decision is therefore to issue an unqualified opinion on the client’s 
financial statements. However, the unqualified opinion may or may not be modified to explain 
that there is “substantial doubt” that the client is a going concern and therefore may not be able 
to continue to operate in the foreseeable future. So the auditor’s possible actions are: 
{unqualified opinion (UN), or unqualified opinion with a going concern modification 
(UNGC)}. The two states of nature concern the future operations of the business, namely: 
{success (S), or failure (F)}. 
 The monetary consequences to the auditor of the action-state pairs are as follows: (UN, 
S) = 0; (UN, F) = cost of Type II error; (UNGC, S) = cost of Type I error; and (UNGC, F) = 
0.4 If the auditor makes a Type I error, then the likely consequences flow from the negative 
effects on the client and could include a client lawsuit, loss of future business – both from this 
client and possibly other clients, etc. Denote these losses as LI . We expect these losses to be a 
function of client characteristics, and ceteris paribus, we assume LI is the same for Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 audit firms. However, extensive prior literature, starting with DeAngelo (1981) 
                                                 
4 This simplified payoff structure focuses on the cost of reporting errors since these costs are incremental to 
making an erroneous going concern reporting decision, while the costs and benefits of issuing a correct opinion 
in the circumstances can be ignored.  
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argues that the consequences of Type II reporting errors, denoted LII , will depend on audit firm 
size, reputation investments, etc., such that the costs to Big 4 firms > costs to non-Big 4 firms. 
We treat these costs as having two components, namely, the wealth at risk denoted W, and the 
probability of lawsuit against an auditor, denoted λ. Thus the expected loss is λW, where λWBig4 
> λWnon-Big4 . 
 Now let p denote the probability of a client’ business failure in the future, while (1 – p) 
is the probability of future business success. The value of p captures the level of “substantial 
doubt” that must exist before the auditor is motivated to issue a UNGC.  To a rational, wealth 
maximizing auditor the threshold level of p above which the auditor issues a UNGC depends 
upon the relative values of LI  and LII . Specifically, an auditor is indifferent between issuing 
UN or UNGC when: 
 p ∙ LII  = (1-p) ∙ LI  ,       or  p λW  = (1-p) LI   
and, 
 p = LI  / (λW + LI ) 
 
By inspection, for a given level of the cost of Type I error, LI , the threshold probability, p, for 
issuing a UNGC decreases as W increases and/or as λ increases. Since it has long been argued 
that WBig 4 > Wnon-Big 4  we expect that, ceteris paribus, and for a fixed λ, the threshold for a Big 
4 firm issuing a UNGC will be lower than the threshold for a non-Big 4 firm.    
 We next consider the effects of variation in judge ideology from being less favorable 
to plaintiff investors in a securities class action, to being more favorable to such plaintiffs. This 
can be interpreted as an increase in λ. It is easy to show that  
 ∂p/∂λ < 0, and  
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 ∂2 p/∂λ2 > 0   
That is, for any given level of auditor wealth (W), the threshold probability for issuing a UNGC 
opinion decreases at a decreasing rate as litigation risk increases. Also, as λ→ 1,  
 p = LI  / (W + LI ) 
That is, when a lawsuit is certain to occur if the auditor gives an erroneous opinion, the larger 
is the auditor’s wealth, the lower is the threshold probability for issuing a UNGC opinion. 
These basic relations are pictured in Figure 1. 
 By inspection of Figure 1, as litigation risk increases both Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit 
firms can be expected to reduce the threshold probability of business failure that triggers a 
UNGC opinion. Moreover, if the initial level of litigation risk (i.e. the value of λ) is the same 
for both classes of audit firms, then increasing litigation risk will cause their reporting behavior 
to diverge. That is, the Big 4 firms will become differentially more conservative and issue 
relatively more UNGC opinions than the non-Big 4, other things remaining equal. On the other 
hand, if the initial level of litigation risk (the value of λ) for the Big 4 is greater than for the 
non-Big 4, then their GC reporting behavior may converge as λ increases. For example, if the 
initial value of λ for the Big 4 is close to 1, even when judge ideology is quite conservative, 
while the initial value of λ for the non-Big 4 with conservative judges is close to 0, then more 
liberal judges will have relatively little impact on the already high litigation risk facing Big 4 
firms, but can have a large impact on the litigation risk facing non-Big 4 firms. As shown in 
Figure 1, suppose λ𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐵𝑖𝑔4 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑦=0 is the probability of lawsuit against a non-Big 4 
firm in the case of Type II error when the judges are most conservative ones and 
λ𝐵𝑖𝑔4 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑦=0 is the corresponding probability of lawsuit against a Big 4 firm. As the 
judges become more liberal thereby increasing λ, the result will be a convergence of Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 GC reporting behavior.  
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 Since the initial value of λ facing Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 audit firms is not known, the 
relative impact of heightened litigation risk arising from more liberal judge ideology on the 
Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 firms is an empirical question. However, anticipating the larger settlements 
associated with a deep pocket audit firm, plaintiffs are more likely to commence litigation 
against Big 4 audit firms. This suggests that λ may well be greater for Big 4 firms than for non-
Big 4 firms.  
3. Institutional Background, Related Literature, and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 U.S. Judge Ideology and Litigation Risk 
Under the U.S. judicial system, securities class-action lawsuits under the 1933 and 1934 
securities’ laws are filed in federal courts. In the federal court system, there are 94 district 
courts of trials and 12 circuit courts of appeals that review cases decided in district courts within 
the circuit. The 12 geographically defined circuits include 11 numbered circuits (from the First 
Circuit to the Eleven Circuit) and the District of Columbia Circuit (i.e. the D.C. Circuit). The 
plaintiffs of securities class-action lawsuits first file a complaint against the defendant in one 
of the 94 district courts. If the judge dismisses a case or the trial reaches a verdict in the district 
court, parties dissatisfied with the decision has a right to appeal the case to the corresponding 
circuit court. After receiving the case, the court randomly assigns a panel of three judges to the 
case. The final decision for the case will be based on the panel’s majority opinion (i.e., at least 
two of the three judges on the panel must agree with the decision). Although the Supreme Court 
can send cases back to district and circuits for review, it only accepts 1 percent of all cases it 
receives. In this way, the decisions by judges in circuit courts can be very influential because 
they can set a legal precedent when deciding appeals and can affect the decisions of district 
judges. 
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Judges in all federal courts are appointed to their office by the then President of the 
United States, with the approval of the U.S. Senate. Presidents almost always appoint members 
of the President’s own political party as judges, so that they share the same ideology and 
judicial outcomes are more likely to be aligned with the Presidents’ own policy preferences 
(Dorsen, 2006; Federal Judicial Center, 2006). After appointment, federal judges almost always 
hold office for as long as they wish, with the U.S. Constitution guaranteeing that their salaries 
will not decrease (Federal Judicial Center, 2006). This life tenure and salary protection fosters 
judiciary independence and gives judges great latitude to vote based on their own ideology.  
It is well-documented in the political science literature that judge ideology influences 
judicial votes in federal courts, with judges appointed by Democratic Presidents being more 
protective of private plaintiffs and in favor of government intervention than those appointed by 
Republican Presidents. Cross and Tiller (1998) document that panels of judges dominated by 
Democratic appointees are more likely to produce liberal decisions than are panels controlled 
by Republican appointees. They argue that even though legal doctrine appears to play an 
important role in the partisan struggle over policy circuit court judges are more prone to obey 
(disobey) legal doctrine when such doctrine supports (does not support) their own partisan or 
ideological policy preferences. Supporting this argument, by analyzing 84 studies in the legal 
literature between 1959 and 1998, Pinello (1999) concludes that almost one half of the variance 
of judicial actions is attributable to judge partisanship. In a similar vein, Sunstein et al. (2004) 
show that circuit court judges’ votes are explained by the political party of the appointing 
Presidents.  
Supporting the importance of judge ideology to judicial outcomes in class-action 
lawsuits, Hui et al. (2018) find that judge ideology complements existing measures of litigation 
risk based on industry membership and firm characteristics and is economically meaningful in 
predicting litigation occurrence. Firms in more liberal circuits are more likely to be sued in 
 12 
 
securities class-action lawsuits. The evidence in the prior legal studies and in Hui et al. (2018) 
collectively suggests that the ideology of federal circuit judges creates the variation in the 
litigation risk arising from securities’ laws. 
3.2 Prior Theory on Auditing Institutions and Hypothesis Development  
 It is generally recognized that information asymmetries play an important role in 
explaining auditing institutions. Specifically, there is an asymmetry of information between 
auditors and investors, creditors, and regulators concerning the effort expended by an auditor 
in verifying financial statements. The resulting moral hazard problem gives rise to auditor legal 
liability as an important mechanism to discipline an auditor in the event of audit failure (e.g., a 
failure to detect materially misstated financial statements through negligence or worse 
behavior, such as collusive fraud with a client or to not issue a going concern modified opinion 
on clients that subsequently fail). To empirically study the effects of legal liability on auditors, 
it is useful to examine situations where the degree of liability varies since, in a fixed legal 
environment, it is difficult (impossible) to disentangle the effects of legal liability from the 
effects of other economic (e.g. reputation) and non-economic incentives (e.g. ethics) on auditor 
behavior. The toughness of legal regimes is known to vary considerably across countries (see 
Wingate (1997) and others), with the U.S. normally considered to be the toughest legal regime 
auditors face internationally.   
As noted earlier, an important feature of our study is that we examine within-U.S.A. 
legal liability differences and we separately examine the effects of variations in litigation risk 
on Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 public accounting firms. It is well established in the prior literature that 
the audit quality of Big 4 firms exceeds the audit quality of non-Big 4 firms, irrespective of the 
legal environment in which the firms operate. This occurs so long as the potential loss (penalty 
for audit failure) to a Big 4 firm from association with a client exceeds the potential loss to a 
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non-Big 4 firm, were it to audit the same client. Thus a higher litigation risk can be expected 
to qualitatively impact on both types of audit firms, inducing them to exert greater effort (more 
due care). However, Choi, Kim, Liu and Simunic (2008) (CKLS hereafter) show analytically 
and present empirical evidence that increasing legal liability has a differential quantitative 
impact on Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 auditors. Specifically, CKLS show that as the toughness of legal 
regimes increases, both the audit effort and audit fees of Big 4 and the non-Big 4 audit firms 
tend to converge. They show that when the production function for assurance is concave (from 
below) in effort and there is a given change in legal liability, it is relatively less costly for non-
Big 4 firms (compared to Big 4 firms) to increase their assurance levels (i.e. audit quality). As 
a result, the audit quality of the Big 4 is considerably higher than the non-Big 4 in weak legal 
environments, while the two types of audit firms are more similar in tough legal environments.  
 However, as discussed in section 2, these arguments do not directly apply to auditors’ 
going concern reporting. If Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors face the same probability of being 
sued in an event of audit failure, then the higher “wealth at risk” (W) of the Big 4 firms causes 
them to be more conservative and issue a going concern report at a lower probability (p) of 
client future business failure than would a non-Big 4 firm in similar circumstances. As litigation 
risk (λ) increases, the Big 4 would become even more conservative than the non-Big 4, and 
their reporting behavior would diverge. However, as discussed in section 2 and shown in Figure 
1, if the two classes of audit firms face different initial levels of litigation risk (different λ’s) 
(i.e. when the level of judge liberality is low) and the initial λBig 4 is sufficiently greater than the 
initial λnon-Big 4 , then their going concern reporting behavior will converge as λ increases. This 
leads to the following basic hypothesis. 
H: All else equal, the effects of variation in federal judge ideology on auditors’ going concern 
reporting incentives will be different for Big 4 audit firms than for non-Big 4 ones. 
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4. Research Design 
4.1 Measurement 
Empirically, we follow Hui et al. (2018) and adopt their measure of judge ideology: the 
political affiliation of the appointing President. To identify each judge’s appointing President, 
we obtain biographical data of circuit court judges from the Federal Judicial Center’s website. 
Specifically, judge ideology in a circuit is calculated as the probability that appointees of 
Democratic Presidents dominate a panel of three judges randomly selected from the circuit 
(𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡), calculated using the following formula: 
𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 = 𝐶(𝑥, 3) 𝐶(𝑦, 3)⁄ + 𝐶(𝑥, 2) × 𝐶(𝑦 − 𝑥, 1) 𝐶(𝑦, 3)⁄  (1) 
where 𝑥 is the number of Democratic appointees in the circuit and 𝑦 is the total number of 
judges in the circuit, both measured at the end of each month. A higher value of 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡 
means that the circuit is more liberal. To measure ex-ante litigation risk at the firm-year level, 
we assign each firm-year observation to a circuit based on the firm’s historical headquarters 
location, as civil procedure usually requires securities lawsuits to be filed in the circuit where 
the firm’s headquarters is located (hereafter, the home circuit).  
Firms’ historical locations are obtained from Loughran and McDonald (2016) 5 and the 
historical segments of Compustat segments data. In unreported tables, we also use the highest 
judge ideology in the circuit where the audit office is located, the circuit where the firm 
headquarters are located, and the circuit where the firms are incorporated. The results are 
qualitatively unchanged. In our sample, 80% of firm-years have the state of historical 
headquarter the same as the state of their auditors’ office. 85% of firm-years have the circuit 
of historical headquarter the same as the state of their auditors’ office. We report the results 
based on firms’ historical locations because when an auditor is sued the firm is usually a 
                                                 
5 The data is provided at https://sraf.nd.edu/data/augmented-10-x-header-data/. 
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codefendant, shareholders seldom only sue auditors without litigating against the firm. Our 
results are qualitatively unchanged when we use the state of auditors’ office.  
4.2 Sample Selection  
We obtain the audit related from Audit Analytics, financial variables from the 
Compustat database, and stock price data from the CRSP database for the years from 2000 to 
2014. Bankruptcy data is from Audit Analytics and is from 2000 to 2015. As in prior studies, 
our analyses concern financially distressed firms because the going-concern decision is more 
salient among this group, and we focus on first-time going concern opinions because an initial 
going-concern opinion requires more discretion (e.g., Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler 
1994; Mutchler, Hopwood, and McKeown 1997; DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 
2002; DeFond et al. 2016; Anantharam et al. 2016). Financially distressed firms are defined as 
those whose income before extraordinary items is negative or cash flow from operations is 
negative. Our final sample starts in 2001 rather than 2000, the first year for which Audit 
Analytics Opinions database provides data on auditors’ opinions, because we need lagged audit 
opinion information to identify first-time going concern opinions.  
We restrict our sample to publicly-traded companies headquartered and incorporated in 
the U.S. and audited by U.S. accounting firms to ensure that all accounting firms and clients in 
the sample are subject to the same U.S. legal and institutional environment. We exclude firms 
in the financial industry (SIC codes from 6000 to 6999). The requirement that firms must have 
audit related, stock market, and accounting data available leads to a final sample of 17,073 
firm-year observations, covering 5,134 unique firms. The sample distributions across two-digit 
SIC industries are reported in Table 1 Panel A. Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of 
our sample across years. Except for the fact that we have only partial year data in 2014, our 
sample is generally distributed evenly across the years. All test variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles of their empirical distribution. 
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4.3 Baseline Model of Going Concern Reporting 
We estimate the following probit regression model to test whether the variation in the 
federal legal liability associated with federal judge ideology affects auditors’ propensity to 
issue a first-time going-concern opinion. To check the robustness of our results, we also run 
ordinary least square models for all the probit models used in this paper. In untabled robustness 
tests, the results are qualitatively unchanged if we use linear probability models (Woolridge 
2010). 
Prob. (First_concern) = a0 + a1×Big4 + a2×Big4×Liberal_court + a3×Liberal_court + 
Controls_Concerns + Locale_Controls + Industry FE + Year FE + e (2)  
The dependent variable, First_concern, is an indicator variable equal to 1 (and 0 
otherwise) if the firm-year receives a first-time going concern opinion. A first-time going 
concern opinion means that the firm did not receive a going concern opinion in the previous 
year. Because Big 4 firms have a “deeper pocket” and greater reputation concerns (DeAngelo, 
1981), we expect that a Big 4 firm has a lower threshold in issuing going concern opinion even 
when the level of judge liberality is low. Correspondingly, we predict that a1 to be positive. 
Our variable of interest is the interaction between Big4 (an indicator variable equal to one if 
the audit firm is a Big 4 firm) and Liberal_court (judge ideology of the circuit where the firm 
headquarters are located). We expect that a2 will be significantly different from zero. 
Specifically, if a2 > 0, then the going concern reporting behavior of the Big 4 diverges from the 
non-Big 4 in federal circuits where there are more liberal judges. Conversely, if a2 < 0, this 
would indicate that the difference in the likelihood of a Big 4 vs. a non-Big 4 audit firm issuing 
a going concern modified opinion is significantly reduced in a federal circuit with more liberal 
judge ideology. The detailed definitions of all variables are in Appendix A. 
We follow the prior literature (e.g., Mutchler et al. 1997; Reynolds and Francis 2000) 
in controlling for a series of variables (Controls_Concerns) capturing client-level and auditor-
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level determinants of going concern opinions. Specifically, larger clients are less likely to fail 
and thereby less likely to receive a first-time going concern opinion. Client size (Lnasset) is 
measured by the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Leverage (Leverage) and change in 
leverage (C_leverage) are included to capture closeness to covenant violation. New issuances 
of equity (Equity) and debt (Debt) are indicator variables, equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the 
firm issues new equity or debt in the subsequent year. Firm’s financial performance is measured 
by indicator variables for losses in the current year (Loss) and the previous year (Lag_loss), the 
ratio of net income to total assets (ROA), the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets (Cfo), 
and sales growth (Salegrw). Short-term liquidity is measured by cash plus short-term 
investments scaled by total assets (Cashsti). Altman Z-score (Z_score) is further included to 
capture financial distress. Firms with higher leverage, poorer financial performance, greater 
financial distress are closer to covenant violation. Firm age (Ln_age) is included because 
younger firms are more prone to failure. To control for the potential effect of earning quality on 
auditors’ going concern reporting decision, we include the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (Absnda).  
 As to auditor related controls, in addition to the Big 4 indicator variable, we control for 
the following: audit report lag (Ln_reportlag), which is the the natural logarithm of the lag 
between the auditor’s signature date and the date of the fiscal year-end, and an auditor change 
indicator variable (Auditor_change), equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if a client-firm’s auditor in the 
current year is different from its auditor in the previous year. Prior research shows that the 
probability of receiving a going-concern audit opinion is positively correlated with an audit-
report lag variable (e.g., McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood, 1991; Raghunandan and Rama 
1995; Mutchler et al. 1997). The auditor change indicator variable is included to control for 
potential differential incentives of a new auditor in going concern reporting.   
 Because our measure of federal judge ideology is a circuit-level measure, we control for 
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other potentially confounding locale-level variables: the unemployment rate of the firm’s 
headquarters state in the previous year (Unemployment), the GDP growth of the firm’s 
headquarters state in the current year (Gdp_growth), the natural logarithm of the population in 
the firm’s headquarters state in the current year (Ln_pop), an indicator value equal to 1 (and 0 
otherwise) if the firm’s headquarters state favors a democratic candidate in the presidential 
election in the current year (Blue_state). We also control for firms’ litigation risk associated with 
firms’ financial, stock related, and industry characteristics by adopting Kim and Skinner’s (2012) 
measure (Skinner_litigation). Finally, we include two stock market-based variables to 
incorporate stock market information on firms’ probability of business failure: stock return 
volatility (Idiosyncratic_risk) and the market adjusted cumulative annual stock return 
(S_mkt_adj_ret). Firms with greater idiosyncratic risk and poorer stock market returns are more 
likely to fail. The fixed effects are the two-digit SIC industry fixed effects and fiscal year fixed 
effects. The t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that are 
clustered by state in all of the models adopted in this paper. Our results are statistically similar 
if we cluster standard errors by firm.  
Table 2 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for our variables. The mean of going 
concern is 0.07 indicating that 7% of firm-years receive first-time going concern opinions. 
The rate of going concern opinions is similar to those documented in the prior going concern 
studies. Big4 is 61%, indicating more than half of our sample firm years are audited by Big 
4 auditors. The mean value of Liberal_court is 0.40, similar to Huang et al. (2018). It has a 
first quartile threshold value of 0.25 and third quartile of 0.59, suggesting a large variation 
of ex-ante litigation risk as measured by judge ideology in our sample. Panel B of Table 2 
reports the pairwise (Pearson and Spearman) correlations between other variables and our 
key variable of interest, i.e. judge ideology. There are no significantly high correlations 
between Liberal_court and the control variables, suggesting that there is no serious concern 
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of multicollinearity.  
To address the potential concern that Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients may be different 
and therefore the coefficients on the going concern models of these two different samples 
may also be different, we apply the following model separately for Big 4 clients and non-
Big 4 clients. The controls variables (i.e. Controls_Concerns and Locale_Controls) are the 
same as the ones in model (2).  
  Prob. (First_concern) = β0 + β2×Liberal_court + Controls_Concerns + Locale_Controls +      
 Industry FE + Year FE + e (3)  
5. Empirical Findings 
5.1 Test of Going Concern 
Table 3 reports the findings on auditors’ going concern reporting decisions from our 
baseline regression models. Column (1) reports the results from the probit model as specified 
in equation (2). The marginal effects at the means are reported. For ease of exposition, we 
multiply all coefficients in Table 3 (except for column (3)) by 100. The coefficients present the 
change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable 
and, by default, reports the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. Ai and 
Norton (2003) argue that the coefficient on the interaction term in a nonlinear regression may 
not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term. On the contrary, Le (1998) and Kolasinski 
and Siegel (2010) show that the coefficient, along with its standard error is still meaningful, 
especially when one is interested in evaluating the proportional rather than the absolute 
marginal effects. In our setting, we are interested in evaluating whether the effects of judge 
ideology differ between Big 4 and non-Big4, rather than the combined effect of ideology for 
Big 4 clients and non-Big 4. Thus, the coefficient on the interaction term is still meaningful. 
Nevertheless, we still apply an ordinary least squares (OLS) model and run a logit model by 
reporting the odds ratios for each variable in the regression. Similar to the OLS model, a logit 
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model is linear in the log-odd metric and thus the odds ratios represent the effect of a given 
variable on the likelihood of receiving going concern opinions (Buis, 2010; Doidge, Karolyi, 
and Stulz, 2013). Odds ratios are also simpler to interpret when there are interaction terms in 
the model. Columns (2) and (3) report the results from the OLS regression and the odds ratios 
from the logit model, respectively.  
The test of our basic hypothesis concerns the interaction of judge ideology and Big4. 
In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients on Big4×Liberal_court are both statistically negative 
at the 1% level. The coefficient on Big4 is statistically positive. The results suggest that while 
Big 4 firms are more likely to issue going concern opinions than non-Big 4, the reporting 
difference converges in circuits with more liberal judges. After presenting the mitigation effect 
of judge ideology, we report its marginal effects for Big 4 and non-Big 4 in Panels B and C. 
Panel B reports the average adjusted marginal effects, which is the average of the marginal 
effects for each value of judge ideology by treating each firm-year as if having this value of 
judge ideology and leave all other independent values as is and then taking the average of all 
the predictions for this value of judge ideology. Panel C reports the marginal effect of judge 
ideology when all variables are at their means.6 In panels B and C, the marginal effects for non-
Big 4 are 3.59% and 1.93% regarding average marginal effects and marginal effects at the 
means, respectively. Both are significantly positive at the 1% level. In contrast, the marginal 
effects are not significant for Big 4, which means that judge ideology does not affect the going 
concern reporting behavior of Big 4 in a statistically significant way.  
Column (3) reports the odds ratios from the logit model. The the odds ratio for Big 4 is 
2.21 (z-statistic= 4.31), which means the odds of receiving going concern opinions for Big 4 
clients are 2.21 times higher than non-Big 4 clients. The odds on Liberal_court is 2.36 (z-
statistic=3.22), suggesting that the odds of receiving going concern opinion increase as the 
                                                 
6 The Stata –margins- command provides the average marginal effect and the marginal effect at the means.  
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level of judge liberality increases. The odds ratio for Big4×Liberal-court is 0.31 (z-statistic = 
-4.49). This suggests that the effect of judge ideology for Big 4 clients is 0.31 times the effect 
of judge ideology for non-Big 4 clients. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
In other words, the effect of judge ideology for Big 4 clients is 69% lower the effect for non-
Big 4 clients. Taken together, the evidence is consistent with the argument that the going 
concern reporting behavior tends to converge because the non-Big 4 firms become relatively 
more likely to issue a going concern audit opinion as the level of judge liberality increases.  
We also evaluate marginal effects of judge ideology on the likelihood of receiving 
going concern opinions for Big 4 clients and non-Big 4 clients. Columns (4) and (5) reports the 
marginal effects at the means for the non-Big 4 and Big 4 clients, respectively. Subsample 
analysis is superior to the full sample analysis to the extent that subsample analysis allows the 
coefficients on the independent variables vary in the subsample. We find that the litigation risk 
related to judge ideology significantly increases non-Big 4 auditors’ likelihood of issuing going 
concern options. Specifically, in column (4), the coefficient on Liberal_court is 4.87% (z-
statistic = 3.30), suggesting that in circuit with judges who are more liberal, non-Big 4 auditors 
are more likely to issue going concern reports. In terms of economic significance, a one 
standard deviation (0.18) increase in judge ideology from the sample mean (0.39) will increase 
the probability of going concern reporting by 0.88% (4.87×0.18%), which is 8.8% of the base 
going concern ratio for the non-Big 4 sample (10%).7 By contrast, as reported in column (5), 
the effect is not significant for Big 4 auditors. This finding is consistent with the notion that 
Big 4 auditors are less sensitive to the increase in federal level litigation risk than non-Big 4 
auditors, presumably because their initial risk is already high.  
                                                 
7 Because probit model is a nonlinear model, the marginal effect varies with the values of other variables in the 
model. The reported marginal effects are the effects at the means. The summary statistics in Table 2 are those 
for the full sample. In the full sample, the standard deviation for Liberal_court is 0.19 and the mean is 0.40. In 
the non-Big 4 sample, the standard deviation is 0.18 and the mean is 0.39. The mean for First_concern is 0.10. 
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Figures 2 and 3 visualize the predictions of going concern reporting by Big 4 auditors 
and non-Big 4 auditors based on equation (2).8 Figure 2 shows the average adjusted prediction 
for each observed value of judge ideology. We compute the average adjusted prediction by 
treating each firm-year as if having this value of judge ideology and leave all other independent 
values as is and then taking the average of all the predictions for this value of judge ideology. 
Figure 3 shows the prediction of going concern probability for each observed value of judge 
ideology at the means of other variables in the model. We compute the adjusted prediction at 
mean by treating all other variables at their mean values. Note that because the marginal effect 
of judge ideology on Big 4 is not statistically significant, the slightly downward line for the 
Big 4 auditors should not be interpreted as judge ideology having a negative effect on Big 4 
auditors’ propensity to issue going concern audit opinions. In both figures, non-Big 4 auditors 
are more likely to issue first-time going concern audit opinions as the value of Liberal_court 
increases. In addition, the going concern reporting behaviors of Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms tend 
to converge as the judges become more liberal.  
5.2 Supplementary Test: Audit Fees 
As a supplementary test, we examine the association between the litigation risk 
associated with judge ideology and audit fees, and the differential impact of litigation risk on 
Big 4 audit firm fees versus non-Big 4 audit firm fees. The audit fee literature suggests that 
audit fees increase with the level of litigation risk (e.g., Simunic, 1980; Simunic and Stein, 
1996). Our model is as follows.  
Fees = b0 + b1×Big4 + b2×Big4× Liberal_court + b3×Liberal_court + Controls_Fees        
+ Locale_Controls + Industry FE + Year FE + e            (3)  
                                                 
8 The Stata –mcp- command computes the average adjusted prediction and the prediction at the means and plots 
the graphs. We thank Richard Williams for suggesting to use this command. The introduction is available at: 
https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats3/Margins03.pdf 
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Similar to equation (2) in section 4, the t-statistics are based on heterokedasticity-
consistent standard errors that are clustered by state. The dependent variable is Fees defined as 
the natural logarithm of audit fees in the fiscal year. Our variable of interest is the interaction 
between Big4 and Liberal_court. For the control variables, in addition to all the control 
variables used in our going concern baseline model, we follow the prior literature including 
classical determinants of audit fees (e.g., Simunic, 1980; DeFond et al., 2002). The additional 
controls further capture clients’ complexity and business risk, including the total number of 
business segments (Segnum) and the total number of foreign segments (Fsegnum), an 
indicator variable that is set to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the firm is involved with a merger 
event in the current year (MA), and going concern indicator variable equal to 1 (and 
0 otherwise) if the auditor opinion for the fiscal year includes a going concern 
modification. The detailed definitions for all of the variables are provided in Appendix A. In 
addition to equation (3), we also test the effect of the variation in federal judge ideology on 
audit fees separately for Big 4 clients and non-Big 4 clients.  
We report our findings on audit fees in Table 4. Our findings support the notion that 
the variation in federal judge ideology across circuit courts is a useful measure of within-U.S. 
variations in litigation risk. Specifically, in column (1), the interaction of Liberal_court and 
Big4 is again significantly negative, which is consistent with our findings concerning going 
concern opinions that the behavior of Big 4 auditors and non-Big 4 auditors tends to converge 
as the litigation risk rises. We separately test the judge ideology effect on non-Big 4 auditors 
and Big 4 auditors in Columns (2) and (3), respectively. We find that the litigation risk related 
to judge ideology significantly increases the audit fees for both Big 4 clients and non-Big 4 
clients, but the fee increase is higher for non-Big 4 clients than for the Big 4 clients. Note that 
these results are also consistent with the findings in Choi et al (2008) that the audit effort and 
audit fees of Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms converge as across-country litigation risk 
 24 
 
increases. The analytical model in Choi et al (2008) suggests that because the failure rate of 
non-Big4 is higher (in their paper audit failure is defined as a failure to detect materially 
misstated financial statements), an increase in the toughness of legal regime has a greater 
impact on non-Big 4 auditors’ expected litigation cost.   
5.3 Additional Controls, Matched Sample, and Firm-Fixed Effects 
We conduct several additional tests to 1) address the concern that our findings may be 
driven by state level legal liability and SEC enforcement strength, 2) investigate whether the 
effect for non-Big 4 auditors’ going concern reports is partially driven by non-Big 4 clients’ 
greater likelihood of bankruptcy or the effect of judge ideology on non-Big clients’ bankruptcy 
risk; and 3) test the concern that our results are driven by the potential effect of judge ideology 
on auditor choice.  
The underlying implication for the convergence of Big 4 and non-Big 4 going concern 
reporting incentive is that the litigation risk associated with federal judge ideology affects non-
Big 4 auditor’s propensity to issue going concern audit opinions, but does not have a 
statistically significant effect on Big 4 auditors. To address the concern that our findings are 
driven by omitted factors that shape auditors’ legal environment, we add three control variables 
to equations (2) and (3) including a liability sharing index (JSLINDEX), a third party liability 
index (TPLINDEX), and the auditor to SEC office distance (Auditor_to_sec). Anantharaman et 
al., (2016) and Defond et al. (2016) find that these state-level legal liability measures and 
auditors’ distance to SEC office affect auditors’ going concern reporting decisions. In columns 
(1) to (3) of Table 5, we report the findings regarding non-Big-4 auditors, and columns (4) to 
(6) report findings for Big 4 auditors. Consistent with the results in Table 3, the Ideology 
variable is significant in columns 1 to 3, but is insignificant in columns 4 to 6, suggesting that 
non-Big4 auditors issue more going concern opinions when the litigation risk related to federal 
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judge ideology increases, but Big 4 auditors do not change their reporting behavior. This 
evidence suggests that the effect of federal judge ideology is not driven by our measure’s 
potential correlation with the state level legal liability and SEC enforcement strength 
documented by Anantharaman et al., (2016) and Defond et al. (2016). 
In addition, the reason that we do not document a statistically significant association 
between federal judge ideology and Big 4 auditors’ propensity to issue going concern audit 
reports may be driven by the fact that the likelihood of bankruptcy of Big 4 clients is much 
smaller than that of non-Big 4 clients. That is, it is possible that while both non-Big 4 and Big 
4 auditors substantially lower the threshold for issuing going concern audit reports (i.e. the 
lowest probability of bankruptcy at which auditors will issue an going concern opinion) due to 
the increased litigation risk associated with judge ideology, we do not observe it for Big 4 
clients because Big 4 clients are much less likely to go bankrupt than non-Big clients even after 
considering the controls we have included. To investigate this possibility, we conduct several 
tests. First, we adopt several sub-samples of Big 4 clients whose characteristics are matched to 
client characteristics of non-Big 4 clients, and then investigate the effect of federal ideology on 
going concern reports separately for these subsamples. Second, we include firm-fixed effects 
in the Big 4 sub-sample and non-Big 4 sub-sample. Third, we directly examine whether the 
Big 4 indicator variable is associated with clients’ likelihood of bankruptcy in the subsequent 
year.  
Tables 6-10 report results of our empirical investigation regarding the above issue. 
Table 6 shows that after we match the non-Big 4 sample with a sub-sample of Big 4 clients on 
size and industry, our main findings remain consistent. In column (1), the coefficient on the 
interaction between the Big 4 indicator variable and judge ideology is significantly negative. 
In columns (2) and (3), the coefficient of judge ideology is only significant in the sub-sample 
of firm years audited by non-Big 4 auditors. These results are again consistent with our prior 
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findings, supporting the notion that federal judge ideology effects non-Big 4 auditors’ going 
concern reporting decisions but not Big 4 decision, and that the reporting decisions of Big 4 
and non-Big4 converge.  
Similarly, in Table 7, we match the non-Big 4 sample with a sub-sample of Big 4 clients 
both on ROA and the two-digit SIC industry. In Table 8, we match the non-Big 4 sample using 
the propensity score. Specifically, our model for generating propensity scores is reported in 
Panel A, and our findings using the matched sample are reported in Panel B of Table 8. As 
shown in Tables 7 and 8, our main findings remain consistent. For instance, in column (1) of 
Panel B, Table 8, the coefficient on Big4×Liberal_court is significantly negative (estimate = -
3.03, t-stat. = -2.79), and the coefficient on Big4 is significantly positive (estimate = 2.34, t-
stat. = 3.77). This evidence is again consistent with the findings reported in Table 3.  
Table 9 reports the findings after controlling for firm- and state- fixed effects for the 
subsample of Big 4 clients and non-Big 4 clients. The models in columns (1) and (2) include 
firm fixed effects, and the models in columns (3) and (4) further control for state fixed effects. 
Note that since we use firms’ historical location, adding state fixed effects can further control 
for the state fixed characteristics not captured by firm fixed effects. Because our regression 
model controls for firm fixed effects and state fixed effects, we choose OLS models instead of 
probit models following the suggestion of Greene (2004). The coefficients on Liberal_court 
are significantly positive for the non-Big 4 sample in columns (2) and (4). In contrast, in 
columns (1) and (3), for the Big 4 sample, we do not find a statistically significant effect of 
judge ideology on the likelihood of first time going concern opinions. This evidence further 
confirms our earlier inference that judge ideology has a statistically significant effect on non-
Big 4 audit firms’ going concern reporting decisions. Collectively, results from regressions 
using matched samples and including firm fixed effects suggest that the effects of judge 
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ideology on going concern audit reports is unlikely merely driven by the potential that non-Big 
4 clients are more likely to go bankrupt.  
To directly address the concern that our results are driven by the potential greater 
likelihood of non-Big 4 clients to go bankrupt, we examine the coefficient on the Big 4 
indicator variable (Big4) in a bankruptcy prediction probit model. The dependent variable is an 
indicator variable set to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the client goes bankrupt in the subsequent year. 
In column (1) of Table 10, the coefficient on Big4 is not significant. This evidence further 
suggests that our main results are not driven by the differential bankruptcy probabilities 
between Big 4 clients and non-Big 4 clients.  
Moreover, our observed effect of federal judge ideology on going concern audit reports 
may be driven by the possibility that the litigation risk associated with judge ideology affects 
clients’ bankruptcy probability. If this effect differs for Big 4 clients and non-Big 4 clients, 
then our findings can be driven by the differential effects of judge ideology on the bankruptcy 
probabilities of Big 4 clients and non-Big 4 clients. To address this concern, we evaluate the 
effects of judge ideology on firms’ bankruptcy risk. As shown in columns (2) to (4) of Table 
10, we do not observe a statistically significant effect of judge ideology on firms’ bankruptcy 
probability.  
Lastly, if the litigation risk associated with federal judge ideology causes firms to be 
more likely to have non-Big 4 auditors due to the Big 4’s tougher screening of risky clients, 
then non-Big 4 auditors will have a greater client base in circuits with more liberal judges. The 
relative importance of each client is smaller when the whole client base is greater. To this 
extent, the increased tendency of non-Big 4 auditors to issue going concern reports may be 
driven by the decreased importance of clients associated with a larger client base. To address 
this potential concern, we examine the association between federal judge ideology and auditor 
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choice. The controls in our auditor choice probit model we adopt are similar to those in our 
audit fee model, except that we follow Guedhami et al. (2014) by further including the ratio of 
inventory to total assets (Inv) and financial constraints as captured by the firm’s financing 
activities. Column (1) of Table 11 reports the results of our baseline auditor choice model. 
Column (2) further adds the measures for state level legal liability and SEC enforcement 
strength to the baseline model. The coefficients on judge ideology (Liberal_court) are not 
significant in both models, indicating that our results are unlikely driven by the potential effects 
of judge ideology on auditor choice.   
5.4 Going Concern Reporting Errors 
Finally, we test the going concern reporting errors. If non-Big 4 auditors lower the 
threshold for issuing going concern audit opinions, then the rate of Type I error is likely to 
increase. With respect to Type II error, whether a lower threshold decreases the rate of Type II 
errors depends on auditors’ ability to accurately access the likelihood of client bankruptcy. We 
apply a probit model to investigate the determinants of auditors’ rate of Type I and Type II 
errors. The control variables are the same as the ones in our baseline going concern reporting 
model. The dependent variable in the model on the rate of Type I error is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) for client-years which received a going concern opinion from their 
auditor but did not declare bankruptcy in the subsequent year. The dependent variable in the 
model on the rate of Type II error is an indicator variable equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) for client-
years which did not receive a going concern opinion from their auditor but declare bankruptcy 
in the subsequent year. 
Table 12 reports the findings on the effects of judge ideology on auditors’ rate of Type 
I and Type II errors. Columns (1) to (4) report results on Type I errors and columns (5) to (8) 
reports results on Type II errors. For the two types of errors, we first examine whether Big 4 
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auditors commit more or fewer errors when the level of judge liberality is low. To do so, we 
do not include either Big4×Liberal_court or Liberal_court in columns (1) and (5), where we 
use the full sample for the regressions. In column (1), the coefficient on Big 4 is significantly 
positive. This evidence suggests that Big 4 audit firms commit more Type I errors than non-
Big 4 audit firms when judges are conservative. In column (5), where the dependent variable 
is the Type II error indicator variable, the coefficient on Big4 is not significant (t-stat. = -0.85). 
In columns (3) to (4) and columns (7) to (8), we evaluate the rates of Type I and Type II errors 
separately for Big 4 and non-Big 4. We find that the Type I error rate of non-Big 4 auditors 
increases with the level of judge liberality. The coefficient on ideology is significant only for 
firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors, suggesting non-Big 4 auditors increase their issuance of 
going concern opinions to lower the risks of being sued by investors for audit failures. On the 
other side, we do not find the same results with respect to Type II errors. Note that for a lower 
threshold to reduce Type II errors, auditors need to have an accurate assessment of clients’ 
bankruptcy probability. However, auditors’ ability to correctly assess bankruptcy probability 
is still an open question.  
6. Conclusion 
 Auditor reporting when a client faces possible future business failure is important to 
investors, creditors, and regulators. The reporting decision is complex and involves judgment 
because the auditor needs to assess whether or not there is “substantial doubt” about a 
company’s ability to continue to operate in the future. Because a going concern opinion 
requires a forecast of a future event, this reporting decision involves considerable uncertainty 
and a trade-off between possible Type I and Type II reporting errors. A Type I error (issuing a 
going concern modified opinion when a business does not subsequently fail) may lead to client 
lawsuit and harm to an auditor’s reputation. Conversely, a Type II error (not issuing a going 
concern opinion when a business subsequently fails) may lead to lawsuits by investors and 
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creditors, sanctions by regulators, and again may harm an auditor’s reputation.  A rational 
auditor will consider the trade-off between these two possible errors in determining a threshold 
for the probability of business failure that leads to a going concern modified opinion.  For 
example, a very low probability threshold will lead to a high rate of Type I error, while a very 
high threshold will lead to a high rate of Type II error. 
 We develop a simple model of this trade-off where Type II error costs depend upon the 
level of auditor wealth as well as the magnitude of the third party litigation risk that auditors 
face.  Because Big 4 audit firms have long been regarded as auditors with “deep pockets,” we 
expect the probability thresholds used by Big 4 firms to differ from the thresholds used by non-
Big 4 firms. We then consider how variations in third party litigation risk will affect the 
thresholds of the two classes of audit firms, and find that their going concern reporting behavior 
may either diverge or converge as litigation risk increases, depending upon the initial level of 
litigation risk faced by Big 4 firms vs. non-Big 4 firms. 
 We then develop and report the results of empirical tests of cross-sectional differences 
in auditor going concern reporting behavior as a function of variations in the ideology of federal 
judges in U.S. Federal Court Circuits.  The political science literature and the recent accounting 
literature show that the ideology of federal judges in the circuit where a company is 
headquartered is an important ex-ante determinant of litigation occurrence and outcomes. We 
find that the litigation risk associated with federal judge ideology has a different effect on Big 
4 and non-Big 4 auditors’ going concern reporting behavior. Specifically, in circuits with more 
liberal judges, Big 4 and non-Big auditors tend to converge in their reporting decisions. This is 
caused by the greater effect of judge ideology on non-Big 4 auditors than on Big 4 auditors.  In 
a supplementary test, we find that the audit fees charged by Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms also 
converge as the litigation risk associated with judge ideology increases. Our results are 
qualitatively unchanged using several matched samples, and a battery of robustness tests.  
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 In conclusion, we believe that our research contributes to an understanding of the 
importance of variations in within-U.S. litigation risk associated with federal judge ideology 
on the behavior of auditors in going concern reporting, the pricing of audit services, and audit 
quality differences between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. The findings are potentially useful 
to policymakers who are currently considering a clarification of the term “substantial doubt” 
in auditors’ going concern reporting and debating the appropriate threshold that auditors should 
adopt. Our findings also suggest that a “one size fits all” threshold will have different economic 
consequences for audit firms in different geographic locations, depending on the ideology of 
judges in the corresponding circuits.   
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Appendix A Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
First_concern 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the firm-year receives first-time going concern opinion. First-time 
going concern opinion means that the firm does not receive a going concern opinion in the 
previous year. Source: Audit Analytics.  
Big4 1 (and 0 otherwise) when a firm uses one of the Big 5 auditors (Arthur Anderson, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, or KPMG). For ease of 
expression, we call this indicator variable Big 4 even though it also includes Arthur 
Anderson. Our entire set of results is robust when we delete clients of Arthur Anderson from 
our sample. Source: Audit Analytics 
Fees The natural logarithm of audit fees. Source: Audit Analytics. 
Liberal_court The probability that a three-judge panel randomly selected from a circuit court has at least 
two judges appointed by Democratic presidents, that is, C(x,3)+C(x,2)×C(y-x,1)]⁄(C(y,3)), 
where y is the total number of judges in the circuit court, and x is the number of judges in 
the circuit court who were appointed by Democratic presidents. C(a,b) is the number of 
combinations of selecting b objects from a distinct objects. We then assign each firm-year 
observation to a circuit court based on the firm’s headquarters. 
Lnasset The natural logarithm of total assets (AT). 
Leverage The ratio of year-end total liabilities (DLTT) to total assets (AT). 
C_leverage The change in the firm’s leverage from the previous year. 
Equity 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the firm issues equity (sale of common and preferred stock) in the 
following year. 
Debt 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the firm issues long-term debt in the following year. 
Loss 1 (and 0 otherwise) when income before extraordinary items (IB) is less than zero. 
Lag_loss 1 (and 0 otherwise) when income before extraordinary items (IB) is less than zero is the 
previous fiscal year. 
Roa Net income (NI) over total assets (AT). 
Cfo Cash flow from operations deflated by average total assets from years t-5 to t-1 (cash flow = 
2×OANCF/ (AT+LAG(AT)). 
Cashsti Cash plus short-term investments (CHE) scaled by total assets (AT) in year t; 
Z_score Altman’s Z-score (1968), calculated as: 3.3×(PI+XINT)/AT+0.99× (SALE/AT) +0.6× 
(CSHO*PRCC_F/ LT) + 1.2× (WCAP/AT)+1.4× (RE/AT). 
Going_concern An indicator variable that is set to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the auditor opinion for the fiscal 
year includes a going concern qualification. 
Salegrw Sales growth in the current year, where assets denotes sales (SALE). 
Absnda The absolute value of discretionary accruals. The discretionary accrual model follows the 
modified Jones (1991) model, as implemented by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) and 
modified by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). The abnormal discretionary accruals for 
firm i (which is in industry j) in year t are the difference between the total accruals (TAC) 
and predicted accruals estimated using the model specified as 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0,𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛼1,𝑗,𝑡
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2,𝑗,𝑡 (
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2,𝑗,𝑡 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐺𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3,𝑗,𝑡 (
𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 . 
TAC=IBC-OANCF. All the variables in the discretionary accrual model are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles before estimation. The estimated absolute value of abnormal 
discretionary accrual is winsorized at 99th percentile. Source: Compustat. 
Log_age The natural logarithm of 1 plus a firm’s age. Firm age is measured as the difference between 
the current fiscal year and the first year the firm appears in Compustat. 
Ln_reportlag The natural logarithm of the lag between the auditor’s signature date and the date of the 
fiscal year-end. Source: Audit Analytics. 
Auditor_change 1 (and 0 otherwise) if a client-firm’s auditor in the current year (t) is different from its 
auditor in the previous period (t-1). 
Unemployment The unemployment rate of the firm’s headquarters state at the end of year t-1; 
Gdp_growth The GDP growth of the firm’s headquarters state in year t. 
Ln_pop The natural logarithm of the population in the firm’s headquarters state in year t; 
 36 
 
Blue_state 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the firm’s headquarters state favors a democratic candidate in the 
presidential election immediately before the end of year t-1. 
Skinner_litigation The firm’s litigation risk as of year t measured following Kim and Skinner (2012). 
Idiosyncratic_risk The standard deviation of the residual of the model that regresses daily return on the CRSP 
equal-weighted index for year t-1. 
S_mkt_adj_ret The market adjusted cumulative annual stock return in fiscal year t. 
Invrec The sum of inventories (INVT) and receivables (RECT) divided by total assets (AT). 
Specialist 1 if the ratio of the total fees collected by the auditor for the industry to the total fees 
collected is the highest and 0 otherwise. Source: Audit Analytics. 
Segnum The total number of business segments; this is coded as 1 when this information is missing 
in the segment file. 
Fsegnum The total number of foreign segments; this is coded as 0 when this information is missing in 
the segment file. 
Busy 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the company’s current fiscal year ends in December. 
Mkt_to_book The ratio of the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets 
(AT+CSHO×PRCC_F-CEQ- TXDB)/AT). 
Ma 1 (and 0 otherwise) a firm has a merger event in that year. Specially, if sale_fn is “AA” or 
AB” in Comupstat, then MA is 1. 
Lag_assetgrw Asset growth in the past year, where assets denotes total assets (AT) 
Inv The ratio of total inventories (INVT) to total assets (AT). 
Invrec The sum of inventories (INVT) and receivables (RECT) divided by total assets (AT). 
Std_cfo Firm-specific standard deviation of the cash flow from operations deflated by average total 
assets from years t-5 to t-1 (cash flow = 2×OANCF/ (AT+LAG(AT)). We require at least 
three years of data available for standard variation calculation. 
Financing An indicator variable that is set to 1 if the sum of new long-term debt plus new equity 
(DLTIS+SSTK) exceeds 20% of total assets and 0 otherwise. 
JSLINDEX Index of joint-and-several-liability (JSL) rules in the state. JSLINDEX is set to 0 for pure 
proportionate liability, set to 1 for full JSL, and set to 0.5 for some ‘‘modified’’ version of 
JSL that is between pure proportionate liability and full JSL. Following Anantharaman, 
Pittman, and Wans (2016) in constructing this measure, we assign to each client firm the 
highest of the indices assigned to the client’s state of incorporation, the client’s state of 
headquarters, the state of the audit engagement office. Source: American Tort Reform 
Association (ATRA) ( 2014). 
TPLINDEX An index developed by Pacini et al. (2000) and Gaver et al. (2012), measuring the extent to 
which auditors can be held liable for negligence by third-party nonclients. The index scales 
from 1 to 9, with 1 (9) representing the most restrictive (expansive) definition of third 
parties who can hold the auditor liable for negligence. Following Anantharaman, Pittman, 
and Wans (2016) in constructing this measure, we assign to each client firm the highest of 
the indices assigned to the client’s state of incorporation, the client’s state of headquarters, 
the state of the audit engagement office. 
Auditor_to_sec 1 (and 0 otherwise) if a client-year’s auditor is located within 100 kilometers of an SEC 
regional office.  
Type I Error 1 (and 0 otherwise) for client-years which received a going concern opinion from their 
auditor but did not declare bankruptcy in the subsequent year. 
Type II Error 1 ( and 0 otherwise) for client-years which did not receive a going concern opinion from 
their auditor but declare bankruptcy in the subsequent year. 
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Figure 1 The Effect of Increasing Federal Litigation Risk on the Threshold for Issuing a Going 
Concern Opinion 
This figure illustrates the theoretical relation between the probability of a lawsuit against an auditor 
and the threshold values (of the probability of bankruptcy) above which auditors issue going concern 
audit reports. “λ” refers to the probability of a lawsuit against an auditor, and “P” refers to the 
threshold bankruptcy probabilities for issuing going concern opinions. 
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Figures 2 & 3 The Empirical Probability of Issuing a Going Concern Opinion as a Function of Federal Judge Ideology  
Figure 2 shows the average adjusted prediction of going concern probability for each observed value of judge ideology. For each value of judge ideology 
(Liberal_court), we compute the average adjusted prediction by treating each firm-year as if having this value of judge ideology and leave all other independent 
values as is and then taking the average of all the predictions for this value of judge ideology. Figure 3 shows the adjusted prediction of going concern probability 
for each observed value of judge ideology at the means of other variables in the model. We compute the adjusted prediction at mean by treating all other 
variables at their mean values. Note that because the marginal effect of judge ideology on Big 4 is not statistically significant (either average or at the mean), 
the line for the Big 4 auditors should not be considered statistically meaningful. The probabilities are estimated based on equation (2). 
Prob. (First_concern) = a0 + a1×Big4 + a2×Big4×Liberal_court + a3×Liberal_court + Controls_Concerns + Locale_Controls + Industry FE + 
Year FE + e (1)  
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Table 1 Sample Distribution 
This table presents the distribution for our sample. Panel A provides the distribution across 2-digit SIC industries, and Panel B shows the distribution across 
fiscal years.   
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Industry 
 sic2 Freq. Percent %<=  sic2 Freq. Percent %<= 
Agricultural Production – Crops 1 28 0.16 0.16 Trucking & Warehousing 42 75 0.44 59.68 
Metal, Mining 10 98 0.57 0.74 Water Transportation 44 39 0.23 59.91 
Coal Mining 12 55 0.32 1.06 Transportation by Air 45 102 0.60 60.51 
Oil & Gas Extraction 13 686 4.01 5.07 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 46 2 0.01 60.52 
Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 14 14 0.08 5.15 Transportation Services 47 49 0.29 60.81 
General Building Contractors 15 23 0.13 5.28 Communications 48 711 4.15 64.96 
Heavy Construction, Except Building 16 54 0.32 5.60 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 49 291 1.70 66.66 
Special Trade Contractors 17 42 0.25 5.84 Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods 50 366 2.14 68.80 
Food & Kindred Products 20 216 1.26 7.10 Wholesale Trade – Nondurable Goods 51 155 0.91 69.70 
Textile Mill Products 22 77 0.45 7.55 Building Materials & Gardening Supplies 52 3 0.02 69.72 
Apparel & Other Textile Products 23 128 0.75 8.30 General Merchandise Stores 53 38 0.22 69.94 
Lumber & Wood Products 24 102 0.60 8.90 Food Stores 54 44 0.26 70.20 
Furniture & Fixtures 25 78 0.46 9.35 Automative Dealers & Service Stations 55 81 0.47 70.67 
Paper & Allied Products 26 92 0.54 9.89 Apparel & Accessory Stores 56 116 0.68 71.35 
Printing & Publishing 27 137 0.80 10.69 Furniture & Homefurnishings Stores 57 57 0.33 71.68 
Chemical & Allied Products 28 2813 16.43 27.13 Eating & Drinking Places 58 187 1.09 72.78 
Petroleum & Coal Products 29 50 0.29 27.42 Miscellaneous Retail 59 320 1.87 74.65 
Rubber & Misc. Plastics Products 30 121 0.71 28.12 Hotels & Other Lodging Places 70 53 0.31 74.95 
Leather & Leather Products 31 37 0.22 28.34 Personal Services 72 29 0.17 75.12 
Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 32 77 0.45 28.79 Business Services 73 2873 16.78 91.91 
Primary Metal Industries 33 172 1.00 29.79 Auto Repair, Services, & Parking 75 19 0.11 92.02 
Fabricated Metal Products 34 161 0.94 30.74 Motion Pictures 78 52 0.30 92.32 
Industrial Machinery & Equipment 35 1041 6.08 36.82 Amusement & Recreation Services 79 198 1.16 93.48 
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 36 1954 11.42 48.23 Health Services 80 349 2.04 95.52 
Transportation Equipment 37 293 1.71 49.94 Educational Services 82 67 0.39 95.91 
Instruments & Related Products 38 1430 8.35 58.30 Social Services 83 16 0.09 96.00 
Miscellaneous Mfg. Industries 39 158 0.92 59.22 Engineering & Management Services 87 400 2.34 98.34 
Railroad Transportation 40 4 0.02 59.25 Non-Classifiable Establishments 99 284 1.66 100.00 
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Panel B: Sample Distribution by Fiscal Years 
Year Freq. Percent Cumulative % 
2001 1547 9.04 9.04 
2002 1605 9.38 18.41 
2003 1535 8.97 27.38 
2004 1392 8.13 35.51 
2005 1340 7.83 43.34 
2006 1284 7.5 50.84 
2007 1256 7.34 58.18 
2008 1463 8.55 66.73 
2009 1315 7.68 74.41 
2010 981 5.73 80.14 
2011 928 5.42 85.56 
2012 997 5.82 91.39 
2013 1012 5.91 97.3 
2014 462 2.7 100 
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Table 2 Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A reports the summary statistics for all 
the variables. Panel B reports the correlation between federal judge ideology and other variables. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A.  
 
Panel A Summary Statistics 
 Mean Stdev 25% Medium 75% 
First_concern 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Big4 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Liberal_court 0.40 0.19 0.25 0.38 0.59 
Lnasset 4.65 2.01 3.26 4.54 5.93 
Leverage 0.18 0.27 0.00 0.05 0.29 
C_leverage -0.01 0.15 -0.03 0.00 0.01 
Equity 0.78 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Debt 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Loss 0.91 0.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Lag_loss 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Roa -0.32 0.89 -0.34 -0.12 -0.03 
Cfo -0.11 0.31 -0.16 -0.02 0.05 
Cashsti 0.29 0.28 0.05 0.19 0.47 
Z_score 0.56 17.08 -0.81 1.47 3.53 
Salegrw1 0.21 1.04 -0.15 0.01 0.22 
Absnda 0.19 0.33 0.04 0.10 0.21 
Log_age 2.64 0.63 2.20 2.56 3.04 
Ln_reportlag 4.21 0.37 4.06 4.28 4.44 
Auditor_change 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Unemployment_hhf 6.44 2.05 4.90 5.90 7.40 
Gdp_growth_hhf 3.84 3.00 2.29 4.00 5.65 
Ln_pop_hhf 9.41 0.89 8.76 9.43 10.18 
Blue_state_hhf 0.80 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Skinner_litigation 0.23 0.28 0.03 0.10 0.32 
Idiosyncratic_risk 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 
S_mkt_adj_ret 0.06 0.81 -0.40 -0.05 0.38 
Invrec 0.25 0.21 0.07 0.20 0.38 
Specialist 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Segnum 2.31 3.67 0.00 0.00 3.00 
Fsegnum 3.13 5.35 0.00 0.00 4.00 
Busy 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Mkt_to_book 2.49 5.04 1.02 1.42 2.46 
Ma 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lag_assetgrw 0.31 1.31 -0.14 -0.00 0.21 
Inv 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.16 
Std_cfo 0.17 0.31 0.05 0.09 0.17 
Financing 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
JSLINDEX 0.88 0.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 
TPLINDEX 5.21 1.19 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Auditor_to_sec 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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Panel B Correlation between Federal Judge Ideology and Other Variables 
 Pearson Correlation Spearman Correlation 
First_concern 0.000 0.974 0.002 0.802 
Big4 0.065 <0.001 0.071 <0.001 
Lnasset -0.058 <0.001 -0.052 <0.001 
Leverage -0.093 <0.001 -0.118 <0.001 
C_leverage 0.001 0.910 0.009 0.275 
Equity 0.111 <0.001 0.106 <0.001 
Debt -0.118 <0.001 -0.112 <0.001 
Loss 0.029 <0.001 0.034 <0.001 
Lag_loss 0.081 <0.001 0.083 <0.001 
Roa -0.036 <0.001 -0.106 <0.001 
Cfo -0.083 <0.001 -0.121 <0.001 
Cashsti 0.186 <0.001 0.199 <0.001 
Z_score -0.006 0.470 -0.017 0.037 
Salegrw1 0.009 0.219 0.006 0.449 
Absnda 0.008 0.325 0.002 0.832 
Log_age -0.136 <0.001 -0.140 <0.001 
Ln_reportlag -0.083 <0.001 -0.070 <0.001 
Auditor_change -0.006 0.418 -0.007 0.379 
Unemployment_hhf 0.248 <0.001 0.229 <0.001 
Gdp_growth_hhf 0.031 <0.001 0.011 0.175 
Ln_pop_hhf 0.434 <0.001 0.442 <0.001 
Blue_state_hhf 0.352 <0.001 0.348 <0.001 
Skinner_litigation 0.015 0.043 0.025 0.002 
Idiosyncratic_risk 0.004 0.591 0.034 <0.001 
S_mkt_adj_ret 0.016 0.038 0.024 0.003 
Invrec -0.038 <0.001 -0.039 <0.001 
Specialist 0.006 0.424 0.003 0.724 
Segnum -0.004 0.635 0.046 <0.001 
Fsegnum 0.057 <0.001 0.075 <0.001 
Busy -0.002 0.747 0.001 0.876 
Mkt_to_book 0.034 <0.001 0.113 <0.001 
Ma 0.029 <0.001 0.035 <0.001 
Lag_assetgrw 0.028 <0.001 0.005 0.531 
Inv -0.034 <0.001 -0.046 <0.001 
Std_cfo 0.027 0.001 0.121 <0.001 
Financing -0.015 0.052 -0.017 0.038 
JSLINDEX 0.234 <0.001 0.260 <0.001 
TPLINDEX -0.263 <0.001 -0.227 <0.001 
Auditor_to_sec 0.120 <0.001 0.113 <0.001 
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Table 3 Federal Judge Ideology and the Likelihood of Issuing Going Concern Opinion 
This table reports the regression results on the relation between first-time going concern opinion and circuit court 
judge ideology. In panel A, columns (1), (4), (5) use probit models. Column (2) uses an ordinary least square 
regression. Column (3) reports odds ratio from a logit model. The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 (and 
0 otherwise) if the firm-year receives first-time going concern opinion. First-time going concern opinion means 
that the firm does not receive a going concern opinion in the previous year. For ease of exposition, coefficients in 
columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) are multiplied by 100. z-stats based on standard errors clustered by state are reported 
in parentheses below the coefficients. Panels B and C report the average marginal effect of judge ideology and 
the marginal effect of judge ideology at the means for Big 4 clients and non-Big 4 clients, respectively. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
Panel A Results from Various Models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 First_Concern First_Concern First Concern First_Concern First_Concern 
 VARIABLES 
Probit Model 
Full Sample 
OLS Model  
Full Sample 
Odds ratio from 
the logit model 
Full Sample 
Probit Model 
Non-Big 4 Sample 
Probit Model 
Big 4 Sample 
Big4 2.00*** 3.63*** 2.21***   
 [4.14] [4.26] [4.31]   
Big4×Liberal_court -2.97*** -4.98*** 0.31***   
 [-3.97] [-3.30] [-4.49]   
Liberal_court 2.35*** 4.70*** 2.36*** 4.87*** -0.33 
 [3.07] [3.06] [3.22] [3.30] [-0.68] 
Lnasset -1.10*** -1.04*** 0.68*** -1.85*** -0.49*** 
 [-9.18] [-4.66] [-8.62] [-6.84] [-6.29] 
Leverage -0.00 -1.55 0.90 0.09 0.09 
 [-0.00] [-1.35] [-0.48] [0.06] [0.35] 
C_leverage 5.27*** 16.77*** 6.21*** 4.96*** 4.53*** 
 [9.70] [7.04] [9.10] [4.26] [8.57] 
Equity -0.57** -0.83 0.82** -1.05* -0.25 
 [-1.98] [-1.47] [-2.02] [-1.95] [-1.23] 
Debt 0.99*** 1.76*** 1.41*** 1.89** 0.37*** 
 [3.41] [2.70] [3.15] [2.40] [2.99] 
Loss 1.67*** 1.49*** 2.57*** 2.96*** 0.87*** 
 [5.15] [4.46] [5.05] [4.59] [2.87] 
Lag_loss 1.32*** 1.86*** 1.67*** 2.77*** 0.44*** 
 [5.69] [4.88] [5.16] [4.52] [2.78] 
Roa -0.16 -3.13*** 0.91 -0.25 -0.55*** 
 [-0.81] [-3.58] [-1.13] [-0.66] [-3.02] 
Cfo -3.54*** -11.91*** 0.28*** -4.68*** -2.63*** 
 [-5.89] [-7.85] [-4.52] [-4.61] [-5.37] 
Salegrw -0.43*** -12.29*** 0.11*** -0.54* -0.34*** 
 [-3.89] [-11.98] [-8.74] [-1.82] [-5.40] 
Cashsti -6.09*** -0.03 1.00 -10.55*** -3.70*** 
 [-9.43] [-1.26] [-0.79] [-7.76] [-9.73] 
Z_score -0.01 -0.75*** 0.85*** -0.00 -0.02** 
 [-1.00] [-4.36] [-3.53] [-0.03] [-1.98] 
Ln_age -0.14 -0.47 0.90 -1.11*** 0.28** 
 [-0.94] [-0.42] [-0.65] [-2.84] [2.31] 
Absnda -0.22 -0.22 0.96 0.09 -0.25 
 [-0.51] [-0.65] [-0.71] [0.12] [-0.94] 
Ln_reportlag 4.38*** 7.73*** 4.68*** 8.22*** 1.94*** 
 [11.55] [7.38] [10.21] [8.54] [9.22] 
Auditor_change 0.04 0.11 1.03 -0.08 0.27 
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 [0.12] [0.16] [0.25] [-0.14] [0.72] 
Unemployment 0.26* 0.50** 1.09* 0.80*** 0.06 
 [1.91] [2.20] [1.83] [3.10] [0.62] 
Gdp_growth 0.05 0.10 1.02 0.16 0.01 
 [0.92] [0.85] [0.82] [1.23] [0.24] 
Ln_pop -0.21* -0.42* 0.93 -0.80*** 0.01 
 [-1.86] [-1.85] [-1.58] [-3.11] [0.09] 
Blue_state 0.28 0.67 1.13 0.08 0.31* 
 [1.25] [1.62] [1.42] [0.16] [1.66] 
Skinner_litigation 4.64*** 6.62*** 4.94*** 8.15*** 2.08*** 
 [9.32] [4.98] [8.28] [6.44] [6.11] 
Idiosyncratic_risk 26.60*** 114.66*** 4,128.81*** 36.84*** 17.93*** 
 [5.43] [8.43] [4.39] [3.35] [4.02] 
S_mkt_adj_ret -2.45*** -5.69*** 0.41*** -4.55*** -1.03*** 
 [-16.60] [-14.21] [-15.93] [-19.49] [-7.07] 
Observations 17,073 17,117 17,045 6,560 10,413 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error State State State State State 
Pseudo/Adj. R-squared 0.3163 0.1865 0.3098 0.2706 0.3945 
 
Panel B The Average Marginal Effects of Judge Ideology for Big 4 and Non-Big 4 
  Delta-method    
 dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [ 95% Conf. Interval ] 
Liberal_court 
      
Big4       
0 0.0359 0.0116 3.10 0.002 0.0132 0.0586 
1 -0.0114 0.0138 -0.82 0.412 -0.0385 0.0158 
 
Panel C The Marginal Effects of Judge Ideology at the Mean for Big 4 and Non-Big 4 
  Delta-method    
 dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [ 95% Conf. Interval ] 
Liberal_court 
      
Big4       
0 0.0193 0.0063 3.06 0.002 0.0069 0.0316 
1 -0.0071 0.0088 -0.80 0.422 -0.0243 0.0102 
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Table 4 Federal Judge Ideology and Audit Fees 
This table reports the OLS regression results on the relation between audit fees and circuit court judge ideology. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees. Standardized coefficients are reported. t-stats based 
on standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fees Fees Fees 
 Full Sample Non-Big 4 Sample Big 4 Sample 
Big4 19.79***   
 [17.82]   
Big4×Liberal_court -2.77***   
 [-3.07]   
Liberal_court 5.58*** 7.38*** 3.85** 
 [4.19] [4.59] [2.48] 
lnasset 76.70*** 78.54*** 76.79*** 
 [68.80] [50.14] [36.48] 
Invrec 6.02*** 4.89*** 8.82*** 
 [9.94] [3.06] [13.93] 
Specialist 1.02** 1.71*** 1.34** 
 [2.31] [15.88] [2.20] 
Segnum 5.69*** 3.88*** 7.58*** 
 [8.84] [3.46] [7.57] 
Fsegnum 5.92*** 8.24*** 5.98*** 
 [6.50] [6.05] [5.32] 
Roa -2.66*** -3.17* -3.02*** 
 [-3.21] [-1.88] [-3.94] 
Leverage 0.31 2.19*** -1.33 
 [0.46] [2.81] [-1.34] 
Loss 4.15*** 7.21*** 2.88*** 
 [9.56] [8.83] [5.79] 
Z_score -4.92*** -8.50*** -6.19*** 
 [-4.46] [-4.47] [-8.05] 
Going_concern 2.59*** 3.49*** 1.74*** 
 [7.76] [5.15] [4.59] 
Mkt_to_book 2.24*** 4.51** 6.31*** 
 [2.76] [2.65] [10.51] 
Salegrw -1.65** -4.09*** -1.11 
 [-2.62] [-4.34] [-1.41] 
Log_age 0.39 1.70 0.08 
 [0.76] [1.50] [0.10] 
Busy 2.87*** 3.24*** 2.83*** 
 [4.09] [3.34] [2.90] 
Ma 0.07 0.00 0.50 
 [0.21] [0.00] [0.99] 
Ln_reportlag 9.14*** 6.43*** 11.18*** 
 [15.02] [7.23] [9.36] 
Auditor_change -2.35*** -2.91*** -2.42*** 
 [-7.20] [-4.60] [-8.66] 
Unemployment -1.32 -0.50 -2.02 
 [-0.78] [-0.18] [-1.15] 
Gdp_growth -0.75 -0.55 -1.34** 
 [-1.28] [-0.46] [-2.24] 
Ln_pop 4.98*** 4.60*** 6.14*** 
 [5.31] [3.61] [5.18] 
Blue_state 2.73** 3.10** 2.58** 
 [2.60] [2.26] [2.20] 
Skinner_litigation 0.72 3.73*** -0.41 
 [1.11] [4.15] [-0.49] 
Idiosyncratic_risk 0.62 -2.53* 4.61*** 
 [1.05] [-1.77] [4.56] 
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S_mkt_adj_ret -0.30 -3.01*** -0.10 
 [-0.98] [-4.23] [-0.26] 
Observations 17174 6663 10511 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error State State State 
Adj. R-sq 0.8314 0.7179 0.8243 
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Table 5 Federal Judge Ideology and Going Concern Reporting: Additional Controls 
This table reports the probit model regression results on the relation between first-time going concern opinion and 
circuit court judge ideology. The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the firm-year 
receives a first-time going concern opinion. The marginal probabilities at the means are reported. For ease of 
exposition, all coefficients are multiplied by 100. z-stats based on standard errors clustered by state are reported 
in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  First_Concern First_Concern First_Concern First_Concern First_Concern First_Concern 
VARIABLES 
Non-Big 4 
Sample 
Non-Big 4 
Sample 
Non-Big 4 
Sample 
Big 4 
Sample 
Big 4 
Sample 
Big 4 
Sample 
Liberal_court 4.81*** 5.61*** 5.37*** -0.46 -0.32 -0.26 
 [3.13] [3.10] [2.67] [-0.91] [-0.60] [-0.47] 
JSLINDEX 0.28 0.18 -0.03 0.78*** 0.75*** 0.67*** 
 [0.27] [0.18] [-0.03] [3.31] [3.08] [2.69] 
TPLINDEX  0.39 0.40  0.09* 0.10** 
  [1.51] [1.55]  [1.85] [2.03] 
Auditor_to_sec   0.88*   -0.02 
   [1.77]   [-0.09] 
Lnasset -1.86*** -1.87*** -1.77*** -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.46*** 
 [-6.43] [-6.56] [-6.72] [-6.61] [-6.64] [-6.33] 
Leverage 0.09 0.10 0.54 0.12 0.11 -0.05 
 [0.06] [0.07] [0.47] [0.44] [0.41] [-0.18] 
C_leverage 4.97*** 5.00*** 3.95*** 4.49*** 4.47*** 4.25*** 
 [4.27] [4.30] [3.48] [8.69] [8.67] [7.82] 
Equity -1.06* -1.06* -1.08* -0.22 -0.23 -0.26 
 [-1.95] [-1.96] [-1.88] [-1.13] [-1.17] [-1.42] 
Debt 1.89** 1.86** 1.53** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 
 [2.41] [2.36] [2.04] [3.03] [3.05] [3.08] 
Loss 2.96*** 2.92*** 2.77*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 
 [4.53] [4.46] [4.25] [2.88] [2.86] [2.79] 
Lag_loss 2.76*** 2.75*** 2.28*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.42** 
 [4.47] [4.47] [4.05] [2.73] [2.67] [2.50] 
Roa -0.25 -0.25 -0.07 -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.45*** 
 [-0.66] [-0.67] [-0.19] [-3.08] [-3.08] [-2.81] 
Cfo -4.68*** -4.67*** -4.36*** -2.58*** -2.56*** -2.47*** 
 [-4.61] [-4.60] [-5.02] [-5.48] [-5.46] [-5.54] 
Cashsti -10.58*** -10.60*** -9.72*** -3.71*** -3.68*** -3.44*** 
 [-7.96] [-8.08] [-7.79] [-10.48] [-10.34] [-11.21] 
Z_score -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 
 [-0.01] [0.04] [0.08] [-1.92] [-1.89] [-1.85] 
Salegrw -0.54* -0.55* -0.45 -0.34*** -0.33*** -0.30*** 
 [-1.82] [-1.85] [-1.53] [-5.39] [-5.31] [-5.10] 
Absnda 0.09 0.07 0.21 -0.26 -0.27 -0.16 
 [0.13] [0.10] [0.30] [-1.01] [-1.04] [-0.66] 
Log_age -1.11*** -1.04*** -0.89*** 0.31** 0.32*** 0.30*** 
 [-2.87] [-2.74] [-2.65] [2.55] [2.61] [2.74] 
Ln_reportlag 8.21*** 8.24*** 7.05*** 1.92*** 1.92*** 1.75*** 
 [8.50] [8.85] [8.61] [9.26] [9.09] [8.57] 
Auditor_change -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 0.28 0.29 0.16 
 [-0.13] [-0.10] [-0.08] [0.76] [0.78] [0.50] 
Unemployment 0.81*** 0.78*** 0.67** 0.09 0.08 0.09 
 [3.09] [3.09] [2.53] [0.97] [0.90] [1.06] 
Gdp_growth 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
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 [1.24] [1.03] [0.15] [0.22] [0.07] [-0.16] 
Ln_pop -0.82*** -0.88*** -0.74*** -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
 [-3.06] [-3.18] [-2.62] [-0.46] [-0.56] [-0.52] 
Blue_state 0.05 0.23 -0.55 0.27 0.29 0.14 
 [0.10] [0.45] [-0.95] [1.41] [1.50] [0.66] 
Skinner_litigation 8.16*** 8.15*** 7.64*** 2.07*** 2.06*** 1.94*** 
 [6.35] [6.36] [6.01] [6.14] [6.08] [5.85] 
Idiosyncratic_risk 36.72*** 36.51*** 24.76** 17.50*** 17.40*** 16.12*** 
 [3.27] [3.27] [2.32] [3.97] [3.89] [3.65] 
S_mkt_adj_ret -4.55*** -4.54*** -4.03*** -1.01*** -1.01*** -1.02*** 
  [-19.58] [-19.55] [-15.00] [-7.09] [-7.11] [-6.86] 
Observations 6,560 6,560 6,042 10,413 10,413 10,107 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error State State State State State State 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2707 0.2713 0.2651 0.3960 0.3964 0.3990 
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Table 6 Matching on Size and Industry  
This table reports the probit model regression results on the association between first-time going concern opinion 
and circuit court judge ideology using subsamples matched on client size (Lnasset) and two-digit SIC industry. 
The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the firm-year receives first-time going concern 
opinion. The marginal probabilities at the means are reported. For ease of exposition, all coefficients are multiplied 
by 100.z-stats based on standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix 
A. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES First_Concern First_Concern First_Concern 
Big4 1.74***   
 [3.27]   
Big4×Liberal_court -1.78*   
 [-1.89]   
Liberal_court 2.13* 4.34** -0.52 
 [1.85] [2.15] [-0.75] 
JSLINDEX 0.32 0.04 0.59 
 [0.64] [0.04] [1.47] 
TPLINDEX 0.30** 0.40 0.05 
 [2.30] [1.47] [0.89] 
Auditor_to_sec 0.56** 0.86* 0.11 
 [2.03] [1.72] [0.50] 
Lnasset -1.37*** -1.82*** -0.72*** 
 [-9.14] [-6.58] [-7.42] 
Leverage 0.30 0.47 0.27 
 [0.44] [0.45] [0.55] 
C_leverage 5.13*** 3.79*** 4.89*** 
 [6.83] [3.08] [7.41] 
Equity -0.29 -0.75 0.12 
 [-0.91] [-1.47] [0.49] 
Debt 0.92*** 1.34** 0.38** 
 [3.05] [2.07] [2.07] 
Loss 1.92*** 2.60*** 1.20*** 
 [4.53] [3.97] [2.59] 
Lag_loss 1.39*** 2.21*** 0.51* 
 [4.47] [4.30] [1.88] 
Roa 0.01 0.07 -0.58** 
 [0.04] [0.18] [-2.31] 
Cfo -3.73*** -4.37*** -2.53*** 
 [-7.03] [-5.48] [-5.13] 
Cashsti -6.04*** -9.25*** -3.64*** 
 [-8.51] [-7.42] [-9.96] 
Z_score -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
 [-1.18] [-0.20] [-1.57] 
Salegrw -0.45*** -0.38 -0.38*** 
 [-2.59] [-1.17] [-4.47] 
Absnda -0.14 0.03 0.04 
 [-0.28] [0.04] [0.10] 
Log_age -0.18 -0.91*** 0.51*** 
 [-1.04] [-2.71] [2.79] 
Ln_reportlag 4.18*** 6.81*** 1.49*** 
 [8.37] [7.67] [4.37] 
Auditor_change 0.11 0.13 0.13 
 [0.28] [0.20] [0.27] 
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Unemployment 0.40** 0.82*** 0.19* 
 [2.50] [3.01] [1.69] 
Gdp_growth 0.06 0.07 0.09 
 [0.77] [0.45] [1.23] 
Ln_pop -0.33** -0.86*** 0.08 
 [-2.06] [-2.62] [0.53] 
Blue_state 0.04 -0.13 0.17 
 [0.14] [-0.20] [0.61] 
Skinner_litigation 5.88*** 7.61*** 2.89*** 
 [8.73] [5.65] [7.16] 
Idiosyncratic_risk 22.30*** 23.36** 16.80** 
 [3.56] [2.11] [2.50] 
S_mkt_adj_ret -3.00*** -4.15*** -1.45*** 
  [-15.02] [-14.21] [-6.63] 
Observations 11,561 5,396 5,990 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error State State State 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2979 0.2671 0.3953 
  
 51 
 
Table 7 Matching on ROA and Industry  
This table reports the probit model regression results on the association between first-time going concern opinion 
and circuit court judge ideology using subsamples matched on ROA and two-digit SIC industry. The marginal 
probabilities at the means are reported. For ease of exposition, all coefficients are multiplied by 100. z-stats based 
on standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES First_Concern First_Concern First_Concern 
Big4 2.40***   
 [4.05]   
Big4×Liberal_court -3.01***   
 [-3.16]   
Liberal_court 2.28** 3.74** -0.50 
 [2.17] [2.11] [-0.78] 
JSLINDEX 0.24 -0.13 0.52 
 [0.45] [-0.14] [1.48] 
TPLINDEX 0.33*** 0.40 0.15** 
 [2.75] [1.61] [2.53] 
Auditor_to_sec 0.39 0.63 0.10 
 [1.35] [1.29] [0.44] 
Lnasset -1.26*** -1.85*** -0.56*** 
 [-8.47] [-7.26] [-5.56] 
Leverage 0.14 0.48 -0.07 
 [0.26] [0.47] [-0.15] 
C_leverage 4.21*** 3.07*** 3.81*** 
 [5.94] [2.60] [6.04] 
Equity -0.69* -1.07* -0.39 
 [-1.94] [-1.78] [-1.42] 
Debt 1.22*** 1.53** 0.75*** 
 [4.16] [2.25] [3.86] 
Loss 1.88*** 2.73*** 1.10** 
 [4.23] [3.72] [2.18] 
Lag_loss 1.18*** 2.09*** 0.33 
 [3.87] [3.56] [1.34] 
Roa -0.07 -0.04 -0.57*** 
 [-0.31] [-0.12] [-2.78] 
Cfo -3.44*** -4.12*** -2.47*** 
 [-6.73] [-5.21] [-4.59] 
Cashsti -5.92*** -9.98*** -3.16*** 
 [-7.78] [-7.33] [-7.74] 
Z_score -0.00 0.00 -0.02 
 [-0.49] [0.13] [-1.31] 
Salegrw -0.44*** -0.38 -0.40*** 
 [-2.82] [-1.25] [-4.19] 
Absnda 0.01 0.31 -0.11 
 [0.04] [0.46] [-0.32] 
Log_age -0.35* -0.94*** 0.17 
 [-1.80] [-2.83] [0.91] 
Ln_reportlag 4.30*** 6.42*** 1.96*** 
 [10.08] [6.98] [6.64] 
Auditor_change -0.03 0.05 -0.25 
 [-0.10] [0.08] [-0.51] 
Unemployment 0.31* 0.89*** 0.06 
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 [1.87] [3.39] [0.58] 
Gdp_growth 0.02 0.01 0.03 
 [0.28] [0.10] [0.59] 
Ln_pop -0.25 -0.76*** 0.06 
 [-1.63] [-2.73] [0.47] 
Blue_state -0.04 -0.55 0.26 
 [-0.11] [-1.00] [0.82] 
Skinner_litigation 5.38*** 7.71*** 2.48*** 
 [7.21] [5.87] [5.41] 
Idiosyncratic_risk 22.95*** 23.01** 18.14*** 
 [4.16] [2.43] [2.93] 
S_mkt_adj_ret -2.75*** -3.99*** -1.33*** 
 [-16.74] [-17.00] [-6.02] 
Observations 11,536 5,376 5,984 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error State State State 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3014 0.2642 0.3990 
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Table 8 Propensity Score Matching 
Panel B of this table reports the probit model regression results on the association between first-time going concern 
opinion and circuit court judge ideology using propensity score matched subsamples. Panel A reports the results 
of the probit model used for propensity score matching. z-stats based on standard errors clustered by state are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
Panel A. Probit Model for Propensity Score Matching 
VARIABLES Big4 
Lnasset -0.55*** 
 [-34.74] 
Leverage 0.14** 
 [2.21] 
C_leverage 0.21** 
 [2.47] 
Equity -0.14*** 
 [-4.84] 
Debt 0.08** 
 [2.46] 
Loss -0.06 
 [-1.33] 
Lag_loss -0.04* 
 [-1.89] 
Roa 0.11*** 
 [7.13] 
Cfo 0.08 
 [1.43] 
Cashsti -1.34*** 
 [-13.22] 
Z_score 0.00*** 
 [3.81] 
Salegrw 0.06*** 
 [3.27] 
Absnda 0.44*** 
 [10.09] 
Log_age 0.18*** 
Observations 17,385 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3192 
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Panel B. Results from the Propensity Score Matched Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES First_Concern First_Concern First_Concern 
Big4 2.34***   
 [3.77]   
Big4×Liberal_court -3.03***   
 [-2.79]   
Liberal_court 2.10* 4.13** -1.18 
 [1.77] [2.16] [-1.59] 
JSLINDEX 0.26 -0.31 0.79** 
 [0.47] [-0.32] [2.43] 
TPLINDEX 0.31** 0.32 0.10 
 [2.31] [1.27] [1.46] 
Auditor_to_sec 0.49* 0.70 0.19 
 [1.75] [1.42] [0.86] 
Lnasset -1.41*** -2.03*** -0.61*** 
 [-9.36] [-7.34] [-5.28] 
Leverage 0.01 0.28 -0.04 
 [0.01] [0.29] [-0.08] 
C_leverage 4.91*** 3.07** 5.27*** 
 [5.87] [2.53] [7.29] 
Equity -0.49* -0.91* -0.09 
 [-1.69] [-1.76] [-0.37] 
Debt 1.24*** 1.27** 0.75*** 
 [4.61] [1.97] [3.19] 
Loss 1.99*** 2.58*** 1.22*** 
 [4.10] [3.03] [2.67] 
Lag_loss 1.56*** 2.63*** 0.47* 
 [4.18] [4.74] [1.66] 
Roa 0.02 0.06 -0.47** 
 [0.06] [0.14] [-2.05] 
Cfo -3.36*** -3.81*** -2.50*** 
 [-6.10] [-4.46] [-4.69] 
Cashsti -5.66*** -9.48*** -2.98*** 
 [-7.24] [-7.42] [-10.32] 
Z_score -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
 [-1.37] [-0.42] [-1.32] 
Salegrw -0.46*** -0.46 -0.35*** 
 [-2.91] [-1.60] [-3.84] 
Absnda -0.16 0.01 -0.17 
 [-0.37] [0.01] [-0.49] 
Log_age -0.31 -0.86** 0.38** 
 [-1.62] [-2.43] [2.11] 
Ln_reportlag 4.44*** 6.59*** 1.74*** 
 [7.57] [7.27] [4.50] 
Auditor_change -0.02 -0.20 0.21 
 [-0.04] [-0.36] [0.36] 
Unemployment 0.37** 0.76*** 0.16 
 [2.21] [2.78] [1.41] 
Gdp_growth 0.04 0.05 0.07 
 [0.57] [0.36] [0.95] 
Ln_pop -0.24 -0.74** 0.07  
[-1.49] [-2.18] [0.42] 
Blue_state -0.02 -0.43 0.16 
 [-0.07] [-0.70] [0.50] 
Skinner_litigation 5.87*** 8.22*** 2.57*** 
 [7.78] [5.87] [6.72] 
Idiosyncratic_risk 17.26*** 12.10 17.22*** 
 [2.69] [1.09] [2.61] 
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S_mkt_adj_ret -2.85*** -3.98*** -1.33*** 
 [-11.98] [-12.63] [-5.60] 
Observations 10,955 5,349 5,326 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error State State State 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2964 0.2719 0.3943 
  
 56 
 
Table 9 Firm- and State- fixed Effects 
This table reports the ordinary least squares regression model results on the association between first-time going 
concern opinion and circuit court judge ideology. The dependent variable is an indicator set to 1 (and 0 otherwise) 
if the firm-year receives first-time going concern opinion. Standardized coefficients are reported. z-stats based on 
standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES First_Concern First_Concern First_Concern First_Concern 
 Big 4 Sample Non-Big 4 Sample Big 4 Sample Non-Big 4 Sample 
Liberal_court -3.59 13.12* -1.33 13.12* 
 [-0.65] [1.75] [-0.24] [1.79] 
JSLINDEX -7.64 7.55 -8.10 7.75 
 [-1.27] [0.87] [-1.29] [0.87] 
TPLINDEX 10.82 -5.16 9.34 -6.70 
 [1.27] [-0.42] [1.08] [-0.56] 
Auditor_to_sec 9.41* 5.91 9.59 4.79 
 [1.72] [1.03] [1.59] [0.81] 
Lnasset -35.75*** -29.05*** -35.69*** -29.88*** 
 [-6.46] [-3.04] [-6.49] [-3.20] 
Leverage -7.38*** -4.52 -7.24** -4.87* 
 [-2.69] [-1.64] [-2.56] [-1.86] 
C_leverage 15.81*** 4.95** 15.82*** 4.97** 
 [3.67] [2.16] [3.65] [2.16] 
Equity -1.09 -2.31 -0.99 -2.22 
 [-0.52] [-0.62] [-0.47] [-0.59] 
Debt 4.18** 3.38 4.22** 3.28 
 [2.55] [1.27] [2.60] [1.23] 
Loss 1.90 1.53 1.98 1.35 
 [1.31] [1.07] [1.33] [0.97] 
Lag_loss 1.05 2.63 1.08 2.54 
 [0.97] [1.29] [0.97] [1.21] 
Roa -11.06*** -7.92 -11.14*** -7.88 
 [-3.96] [-1.09] [-3.98] [-1.07] 
Cfo -12.55*** -9.39* -12.29*** -8.20 
 [-2.88] [-1.79] [-2.82] [-1.50] 
Cashsti -16.29*** -23.71*** -16.01*** -24.63*** 
 [-6.21] [-5.02] [-6.11] [-4.97] 
Z_score -4.65 -0.99 -4.64 -1.19 
 [-1.35] [-0.14] [-1.32] [-0.16] 
Salegrw -1.40 -3.78 -1.30 -3.60 
 [-1.02] [-1.59] [-0.93] [-1.39] 
Absnda -0.87 2.82 -0.78 2.42 
 [-0.66] [1.16] [-0.57] [1.01] 
Log_age 28.17*** 19.65** 29.47*** 20.21** 
 [3.07] [2.19] [3.17] [2.13] 
Ln_reportlag 8.52*** 10.43*** 8.39*** 10.26*** 
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 [2.71] [3.74] [2.73] [3.55] 
Auditor_change -0.17 0.57 -0.11 0.35 
 [-0.12] [0.31] [-0.08] [0.19] 
Unemployment -3.13 -0.94 -3.59 -2.70 
 [-0.98] [-0.22] [-1.02] [-0.64] 
Gdp_growth -0.23 0.83 -0.12 1.30 
 [-0.13] [0.36] [-0.07] [0.51] 
Ln_pop 1.53 0.97 -57.37 7.94  
[0.24] [0.15] [-0.66] [0.11] 
Blue_state 1.12 2.44 0.43 3.59 
 [0.53] [0.80] [0.17] [1.03] 
Skinner_litigation 2.38 6.15*** 2.25 5.86*** 
 [0.56] [3.40] [0.53] [3.29] 
Idiosyncratic_risk 14.69*** 6.65** 14.84*** 6.49** 
 [3.03] [2.17] [3.07] [2.06] 
S_mkt_adj_ret -13.48*** -19.87*** -13.49*** -19.61*** 
 [-6.24] [-12.22] [-6.20] [-12.22] 
Observations  10208 6081 10208 6081 
Circuit FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes Yes 
Standard Error State State State State 
Adj. R-sq. 0.3116 0.2444 0.3117 0.2442 
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Table 10 Likelihood of Bankruptcy 
This table reports the probit model regression results on the association between bankruptcy and circuit court 
judge ideology. The dependent variable is an indicator variable set to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the firm goes bankrupt 
in the subsequent year. For ease of exposition, all coefficients are multiplied by 100. z-stats based on standard 
errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Bankrucpty 
Full Sample 
Bankrucpty 
Full Sample 
Bankrucpty 
Big4 
Bankrucpty 
Non-Big 4 
Liberal_court 0.06 0.04 -0.10 0.31 
 [0.40] [0.21] [-0.52] [1.30] 
Big4 -0.02 -0.04   
 [-0.34] [-0.27]   
Big4×Liberal_court  0.04   
  [0.17]   
Going_concern 3.82*** 3.82*** 3.88*** 2.31*** 
 [13.87] [13.80] [14.62] [7.56] 
Lnasset 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.03 0.13*** 
 [3.46] [3.45] [1.62] [4.30] 
Leverage 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.48*** 0.27** 
 [7.49] [7.49] [6.26] [2.16] 
C_leverage 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.31*** 0.42* 
 [3.91] [3.92] [2.72] [1.66] 
Equity -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 
 [-1.35] [-1.35] [-1.35] [-0.72] 
Debt 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.11* 
 [1.57] [1.58] [0.84] [1.71] 
Loss 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.25** 
 [1.15] [1.15] [0.26] [2.02] 
Lag_loss 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.12** 0.16** 
 [3.15] [3.15] [2.43] [2.08] 
Roa 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.09** 
 [1.00] [1.01] [0.04] [2.26] 
Cfo -0.19* -0.19* -0.04 -0.34*** 
 [-1.72] [-1.74] [-0.37] [-2.73] 
Cashsti -0.34** -0.34** -0.41*** -0.28 
 [-2.39] [-2.42] [-2.60] [-1.28] 
Z_score -0.00* -0.00* -0.01*** -0.00 
 [-1.68] [-1.70] [-2.68] [-1.47] 
Salegrw -0.04* -0.04* -0.01 -0.09** 
 [-1.94] [-1.93] [-0.33] [-2.38] 
Absnda -0.14* -0.14* -0.09 0.03 
 [-1.77] [-1.76] [-0.65] [0.27] 
Log_age 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.04 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.99] [-0.71] 
Ln_reportlag 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.29*** 0.48*** 
 [7.14] [7.15] [4.60] [4.40] 
Auditor_change 0.06 0.06 0.11 -0.03 
 [0.44] [0.45] [1.15] [-0.25] 
Unemployment 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.05 
 [0.30] [0.31] [-0.53] [1.06] 
Gdp_growth 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 [0.74] [0.74] [0.27] [0.63] 
Ln_pop -0.04* -0.04* 0.01 -0.10** 
 [-1.73] [-1.71] [0.53] [-2.49] 
Blue_state -0.09 -0.09 0.08 -0.40*** 
 [-1.23] [-1.24] [1.30] [-3.04] 
Skinner_litigation 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.52*** 0.70*** 
 [7.58] [7.58] [5.35] [3.96] 
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Idiosyncratic_risk 3.45*** 3.45*** 3.42*** 1.79 
 [3.16] [3.15] [3.18] [1.09] 
S_mkt_adj_ret -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.20*** -0.32*** 
  [-8.67] [-8.72] [-5.45] [-4.56] 
Observations 16,891 16,891 10,256 5,996 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error State State State State 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3350 0.3350 0.3953 0.3360 
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Table 11 Federal Judge Ideology and Auditor Choice 
This table reports the probit model regression results on the association between audit choice and circuit court 
judge ideology. The dependent variable is an indicator variable set to 1 (and 0 otherwise) when a firm uses one of 
the Big 5 auditors (Arthur Anderson, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, or KPMG). 
For ease of expression, we call this indicator variable Big 4 even though it also includes Arthur Anderson. Our 
entire set of results is robust when we delete clients of Arthur Anderson from our sample. z-stats based on standard 
errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Big 4 Big 4 
Liberal_court 0.06 0.02 
 [0.58] [0.13] 
JSLINDEX  0.04 
  [1.09] 
TPLINDEX  -0.01* 
  [-1.77] 
Auditor_to_sec  -0.09*** 
  [-2.76] 
Lnasset 0.20*** 0.19*** 
 [21.45] [21.91] 
Roa -0.06*** -0.07*** 
 [-5.39] [-5.21] 
Lag_assetgrw -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 [-9.49] [-9.81] 
Mkt_to_book 0.00 0.00 
 [0.87] [0.19] 
Salegrw -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 [-3.37] [-3.06] 
Inv -0.49*** -0.49*** 
 [-5.73] [-5.51] 
Segnum -0.00 -0.00 
 [-0.87] [-0.75] 
Fsegnum 0.00 0.00 
 [1.06] [0.89] 
Std_cfo -0.09*** -0.08*** 
 [-2.71] [-2.88] 
Leverage -0.10*** -0.10*** 
 [-4.20] [-4.24] 
Log_age -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 [-4.02] [-3.89] 
Financing -0.01 -0.01 
 [-1.03] [-0.97] 
Ma -0.06** -0.06** 
 [-2.25] [-2.02] 
Unemployment 0.02 0.02 
 [1.59] [1.53] 
Gdp_growth 0.00 0.00 
 [0.58] [0.58] 
Ln_pop -0.02 -0.00 
 [-1.34] [-0.29] 
Blue_state -0.01 -0.00 
 [-0.27] [-0.09] 
Skinner_litigation 0.13*** 0.11*** 
 [5.22] [4.66] 
Idiosyncratic_risk -1.78*** -1.80*** 
 [-4.79] [-4.53] 
S_mkt_adj_ret -0.01*** -0.01 
 [-2.99] [-1.35] 
Observations 16,819 16,035 
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Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Standard Error State  State  
Pseudo R-squared 0.4056 0.4031 
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Table 12 Federal Judge Ideology and Going Concern Reporting Errors 
This table reports the probit model results on the association between going concern opinion errors and circuit 
court judge ideology. For ease of exposition, all coefficients are multiplied by 100. The dependent variable in 
columns (1) to (4) is an indicator variable set to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the client-year receives a going concern 
audit opinion but does not go bankrupt in the subsequent year. The dependent variable in columns (5) to (8) is an 
indicator variable set to 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the client-year does not receive a going concern audit opinion but 
go bankrupt in the subsequent year. z-stats based on standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Type I 
Error 
Type I 
Error 
Type I 
Error 
Type I 
Error 
Type II 
Error 
Type II 
Error 
Type II 
Error 
Type II 
Error 
VARIABLES 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Non-Big 4 
Sample 
Big 4 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Non-Big 4 
Sample 
Big 4 
Sample 
Big4 0.80*** 1.57***   -0.06 -0.13   
 [3.50] [3.34]   [-0.85] [-1.02]   
Big4×Liberal_court  -2.04***    0.17   
  [-2.72]    [0.76]   
Liberal_court  2.18*** 4.44*** 0.01  0.11 0.22 0.07 
  [3.07] [3.24] [0.02]  [0.73] [1.23] [0.56] 
Lnasset -1.18*** -1.18*** -2.01*** -0.60*** 0.01 0.02 0.09*** -0.02 
 [-10.50] [-10.49] [-7.54] [-7.64] [0.68] [0.75] [3.08] [-1.32] 
Leverage -0.38 -0.37 -0.63 -0.05 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.15 0.30*** 
 [-0.69] [-0.67] [-0.48] [-0.16] [4.66] [4.62] [1.27] [4.16] 
C_leverage 3.01*** 2.98*** 3.03** 2.64*** -0.21 -0.20 -0.01 -0.24* 
 [5.51] [5.45] [2.40] [5.40] [-1.16] [-1.14] [-0.02] [-1.68] 
Equity -0.19 -0.20 -0.68 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.03 
 [-0.82] [-0.89] [-1.44] [0.16] [0.36] [0.27] [-0.06] [0.70] 
Debt 0.86*** 0.87*** 2.00** 0.20 0.09* 0.09* 0.19*** 0.02 
 [2.77] [2.88] [2.33] [1.50] [1.68] [1.70] [3.02] [0.37] 
Loss 1.47*** 1.46*** 2.79*** 0.75*** 0.08 0.09 0.19** -0.07 
 [4.72] [4.65] [3.87] [2.78] [0.92] [0.98] [2.04] [-0.68] 
Lag_loss 1.23*** 1.22*** 2.52*** 0.46*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.12** 
 [5.26] [5.29] [4.70] [3.11] [3.98] [3.96] [2.59] [2.53] 
Roa -0.07 -0.08 -0.25 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05* -0.03 
 [-0.41] [-0.47] [-0.71] [-0.61] [1.34] [1.30] [1.65] [-0.80] 
Cfo -2.92*** -2.88*** -3.73*** -2.60*** -0.13* -0.13* -0.16 0.00 
 [-5.79] [-5.79] [-4.13] [-6.14] [-1.80] [-1.91] [-1.57] [0.02] 
Cashsti -5.36*** -5.32*** -9.29*** -3.29*** -0.33** -0.33** -0.06 -0.42*** 
 [-9.77] [-9.90] [-7.25] [-9.38] [-2.41] [-2.53] [-0.40] [-2.85] 
Z_score -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 
 [-1.00] [-0.91] [-0.12] [-1.93] [-1.58] [-1.53] [-2.22] [0.14] 
Salegrw -0.37*** -0.36*** -0.33 -0.43*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
 [-3.37] [-3.35] [-1.30] [-5.57] [-1.34] [-1.32] [-1.04] [-0.88] 
Absnda -0.12 -0.12 0.04 0.03 -0.15 -0.14 0.04 -0.30 
 [-0.33] [-0.33] [0.07] [0.17] [-1.46] [-1.42] [0.28] [-1.50] 
Log_age -0.13 -0.10 -0.93** 0.27** 0.03 0.04 -0.00 0.05** 
 [-0.82] [-0.67] [-2.55] [1.97] [0.98] [1.12] [-0.01] [2.06] 
Ln_reportlag 3.45*** 3.44*** 6.99*** 1.38*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.38*** 0.11*** 
 [11.56] [11.22] [8.71] [8.51] [4.44] [4.46] [3.76] [2.77] 
Auditor_change 0.08 0.08 -0.02 0.26 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.04 
 [0.26] [0.26] [-0.04] [0.68] [0.28] [0.27] [-0.23] [0.60] 
Unemployment 0.26*** 0.18* 0.61** 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 [2.68] [1.69] [2.48] [0.77] [0.01] [-0.34] [0.07] [-0.19] 
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Gdp_growth 0.07 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.02** 0.02* 0.02 0.01 
 [1.26] [1.05] [1.26] [0.39] [1.98] [1.87] [1.49] [1.05] 
Ln_pop -0.17 -0.21* -0.65** -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07** 0.00 
 [-1.46] [-1.95] [-2.29] [-0.39] [-0.95] [-1.37] [-2.35] [0.07] 
Blue_state 0.56*** 0.44** 0.54 0.37* 0.03 0.01 -0.18* 0.08* 
 [2.70] [2.13] [1.03] [1.82] [0.55] [0.19] [-1.76] [1.81] 
Skinner_litigation 3.56*** 3.54*** 6.25*** 1.81*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.37** 0.42*** 
 [7.30] [7.35] [5.32] [7.10] [5.93] [5.91] [2.07] [5.27] 
Idiosyncratic_risk 19.20*** 19.25*** 29.17** 11.63*** 1.54* 1.54* -0.01 2.04** 
 [3.63] [3.64] [2.43] [2.79] [1.72] [1.73] [-0.01] [2.35] 
S_mkt_adj_ret -1.87*** -1.86*** -3.62*** -0.78*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.14** -0.14*** 
 [-15.30] [-15.10] [-16.51] [-5.30] [-5.33] [-5.43] [-2.22] [-4.92] 
Observations 16,800 16,800 6,553 10,054 15,611 15,611 5,184 9,119 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Error State  State  State  State  State  State  State  State  
Pseudo R-squared 0.2836 0.2845 0.2476 0.3395 0.2053 0.2064 0.2249 0.2799 
 
